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CONTRACTING COMMUNITIES
Lee Anne Fennell*
Private residential developments governed by homeowners asso-
ciations have rapidly proliferated in recent decades. The servitudes
that form the backbone of these private developments are usually
viewed as autonomy- and value-enhancing private contractual ar-
rangements that are presumptively valid. Unfortunately, the appeal-
ing contractual justification for private land use regimes seems to
have shut down many of the usual paths of inquiry into the ability of
the resulting arrangements to deliver on consumer preferences. In
this article, Professor Fennell seeks to bring the theory surrounding
these developments up to speed by focusing on factors that can drive
a wedge between homeowner preferences and the private land use re-
gimes that the market provides.
In many parts of the country today, a homebuyer who wishes to
purchase a new home is likely to find that home in a private development
governed by a homeowners association.! The growth of such communi-
ties has exploded over the last few decades, and shows no sign of slow-
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1. See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF
PLURALISM IN AMERICA 112 (1998) (noting that seventy percent of new housing in Los Angeles and
San Diego counties is within residential community associations and that such communities "make up
more than 50 percent of new home sales in the fifty largest metropolitan areas"); Stephen E. Barton &
Carol J. Silverman, Common Interest Communities: Private Government and the Public Interest Revis-
ited, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 31,
36 (Carol J. Silverman & Stephen E. Barton eds., 1994) (noting that "in some areas very little is avail-
able that is not in such a development"); David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated
Communities, Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177 (2003) (discussing growth of common in-
terest communities).
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ing.2 The resulting transformation of U.S. neighborhoods, cities, and
metropolitan areas promises to be profound. Robert Nelson has sug-
gested that this shift "may yet prove to have as much social significance
as the spread of the corporate form of collective ownership of private
business property in the second half of the nineteenth century."3 These
private developments, which go by a variety of names in the literature,'
are remarkably diverse. They can be either gated or ungated, can com-
prise anything from a single condominium building to a large neighbor-
hood of single-family homes, and may be targeted at consumers in a va-
riety of income strata.5 However, all such developments are organized
around the same principle: the use of servitudes to privately control land
use.
6
In private developments, a reciprocal, community-wide set of condi-
tions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs) controls each homeowner's
use of her own property, the use and maintenance of common property
and amenities, and other details of community life and governance.
2. The Community Associations Institute estimated that there were 249,000 community asso-
ciations in the United States in 2003, housing approximately fifty million people. CMTY. ASS'NS INST.,
DATA ON U.S. COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS (2003), at http://www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last
visited June 14, 2004). About half of these were planned communities; five to seven percent were co-
operatives; and the balance were condominiums. Id. For background on the history and recent explo-
sive growth of these forms of housing, see Robert H. Nelson, Zoning by Private Contract, in THE FALL
AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 157, 159-66 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
3. Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, in THE VOLUNTARY CITY: CHOICE, COMMU-
NITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 307, 307 (David T. Beito et al. eds., 2002); see Gregory S. Alexander, Di-
lemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5
(1989) ("Residential associations ... have proliferated so much in the past two decades that they may
represent the dominant aspect of the late twentieth century contribution to American residential
group life.").
4. Terms include "common interest developments," "common interest communities," "proprie-
tary communities," "residential community associations," "homeowners associations," "property own-
ers associations," and so on. One difficulty in selecting appropriate terminology inheres in the fact
that the community is one thing, and its governance structure another. Here, I will use the term "pri-
vate development" to reference the community itself, and the term "homeowners association" to refer
to its governance apparatus.
5. Private developments are no longer the exclusive domain of the very wealthy, and are in-
creasingly marketed to people of more modest means. Nevertheless, the poor are not typically found
within these developments. See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48
DUKE L.J. 75, 82 (1998) (observing that "although RCAs [residential community associations] appear
in many varieties, in most of them members are relatively homogeneous and also relatively prosperous
(or at least not poor)").
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, ch. 6, introductory note (2000)
(noting that "[slervitudes underlie all common-interest communities, regardless of the ownership and
organizational forms used"); Nelson, supra note 2, at 158-59 (observing that despite the variety of
names given to private developments, "[a]ll these types of arrangements have in common that they
internalize neighborhood interdependencies under a collective form of private ownership"); Uriel
Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 279
(1976) (noting the centrality of law of servitudes, as well as that of voluntary associations, to private
developments); id. at 279-80 (explaining that the servitudes in private communities can be understood
as "discretionary" ones insofar as the private governance system can alter them later, and describing
these "discretionary servitudes" as "the key to the proper functioning of the entire residential private
government system").
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Upon entering the community, homeowners automatically become
members of a mandatory homeowners association and are obligated to
contribute financially to the services and amenities provided by the asso-
ciation. The servitudes that form the backbone of private developments
are usually treated as autonomy- and value-enhancing private contrac-
tual arrangements that are presumptively valid.7 Consumer reactions to
private developments, and reports of those reactions, have been mixed.'
While this form of ownership is plainly thriving, significant numbers of
these communities have become hotbeds of litigation and acrimony.9
7. See Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Community Associa-
tions: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 589, 693 (1993) (noting
that courts tend to afford a "strong presumption of validity" to the restrictions set out in the declara-
tion); see also infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
8. The Community Associations Institute (CAI) reports survey results that suggest homeown-
ers who live within community associations have slightly more positive perceptions of their communi-
ties or neighborhoods than homeowners who are not community association members have of their
own communities or neighborhoods. See CMTY. ASS'NS INST. RESEARCH FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY
OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION HOMEOWNER SATISFACTION 60 (1999) (reporting that members of
community associations returned a mean score of 3.97 on a five-point scale running from very negative
(1) to very positive (5), while nonmembers returned a mean score of 3.92). It is doubtful that any
meaningful inferences can be drawn from these results, given that there were many demographic dif-
ferences between the groups for which no controls were attempted. See id. at 61-67. For example,
nearly half (forty-nine percent) of the community association members surveyed had incomes of
$55,000 or more, while only twenty-eight percent of the surveyed nonmembers had incomes that high.
Id. at 64. Another CAI survey result shows seventy-five percent of community association members
were satisfied with their association experiences, id., but again, interpreting these results proves diffi-
cult. See Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the
Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 559 (2002) (noting that survey results reported by the
CAI are "significantly at odds" with other available information about community association life);
Wayne Hyatt, Reinvention Redux: Continuing the Evolution of Master-Planned Communities, 38 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 45, 57-58 (2003) (critiquing Franzese's critique of the survey results, but observ-
ing that a seventy-five percent approval rating is not a sign of great success in an industry housing
some fifty million people). For additional views on the level of consumer satisfaction within private
developments, see, for example, Gregory S. Alexander, Conditions of "Voice": Passivity, Disappoint-
ment, and Democracy in Homeowner Associations, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 1, at 145, 162 (concluding, based on his inter-
views with residents in HOAs, that the "[r]esidents of the HOA-governed developments studied do
not appear to be 'happy campers'); Robert C. Ellickson, The (Limited) Ability of Urban Neighbors to
Contract for the Provision of Local Public Goods, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CON-
TRACT, supra note 2, at 192, 194 (noting the "resounding market acceptance" of these communities);
Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective
Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 865 (1999) ("The fact that so
many people, including people with many options, chose this style of private living is strong evidence
that it has much to offer."); James L. Winokur, Choice, Consent, and Citizenship in Common Interest
Communities, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST, supra note 1, at 87, 115 (discussing homeowner dissatisfaction as manifested in apathy and
litigation).
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.13 cmt. b (2000) (observing that
"the quantity of litigation arising out of homeowner challenges to association actions in recent years
may be regarded as excessive"), quoted in Paula A. Franzese, Building Community in Common Inter-
est Communities: The Promise of the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
17, 41 (2003) [hereinafter Franzese, Building Community]; Spencer Heath MacCallum, The Case for
Land Lease Versus Subdivision: Homeowners' Associations Reconsidered, in THE VOLUNTARY CITY:
CHOICE, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 371, 372 ("[Jludging from the numbers of
complaints and litigation, these neighborhood governments are often arbitrary, unresponsive, and dic-
tatorial."); id. at 390 ("CIDs are notorious for their litigiousness."). Ideally, we would want to know
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The notion of voluntary residential communities based on contrac-
tual free choice has generated a robust, ongoing scholarly debate. On
the one hand, these private developments are often viewed as represent-
ing a laudable shift in the direction of consumer choice.1" On the other
hand, critics question the extent to which the developments represent a
voluntary choice on the part of homebuyers, and express concern about
the impact of privately administered servitude regimes on those within
the regimes, as well as on society at large."' As the construction of new
private developments continues apace, scholars also have begun discuss-
ing the possibility of extending the private development template to or-
dinary neighborhoods. 2 The possibility that covenant regimes might
supplant zoning as the dominant form of land use control in this country
has thus enjoyed an important recent revival' 3-one that may have long-
lasting implications for the meaning of residential choice.
As useful as the burgeoning literature on private developments has
been, it has largely failed to come to grips with a number of factors that
may keep such communities from being value maximizing for the people
who live within them, assuming for present purposes that this is the rele-
vant goal. The literature also has failed to glean and adapt insights from
existing theoretical analyses in related areas, such as zoning and pollu-
tion control. As a result, we are suffering from a kind of "theory lag"
with regard to these rapidly proliferating communities. 4 The appealing
whether there is more litigation among neighbors inside private developments than outside of them
(after controlling for the relative sizes of the populations). Silverman and Barton ask the right ques-
tion: "[A]re the problems of associations any worse than those of a small town government?" Carol J.
Silverman & Stephen E. Barton, Shared Premises: Community and Conflict in the Common Interest
Development, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST, supra note 1, at 141, 141. They do not have data on this point, but they speculate that the
problems "are worse because of the ways CIDs differ from small town governments, but many, al-
though not all, differences may be more a matter of degree than of kind." ld; see also Franzese, supra
note 8, at 573 (discussing study showing forty-four percent of 600 HOAs surveyed had been threat-
ened with litigation in a single year) (citing Dennis R. Judd, The Rise of the New Walled Cities, in SPA-
TIAL PRACTICES 144, 158 (Helen Ligget & David C. Perry eds., 1995)); James L. Winokur, The Mixed
Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Per-
sonal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (discussing "mushrooming litigation" and other indications
of dissatisfaction among residents in association-controlled communities).
10. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519
(1982); Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375 (1994).
11. See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994); Winokur, supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 2, at 171-77 (proposing formation of private neighborhood asso-
ciations to govern existing neighborhoods); Steven J. Eagle, Devolutionary Proposals and Contrac-
tarian Principles, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 2, at 184 (discussing
and critiquing this proposal).
13. The idea that land use could be successfully controlled without zoning has been around for
some time. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); Robert C. Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
681 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 306 (1998) (noting that the topic has not been addressed in sufficient depth to
ensure "that the legal evolution will keep pace with the practical evolution"); Winokur, supra note 8,
at 116 ("The sheer size and suddenness of the community associations' movement, and the complexity
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contractual foundation of private developments seems to have shut down
many of the usual paths of inquiry into the ability of the resulting ar-
rangements to deliver on consumer preferences. If one assumes that pri-
vate developments are here to stay, then a first step is to bring the theory
surrounding them up to speed with the reality of these communities. The
goal of this article is to begin that process.
A few preliminary words about the nature and scope of the inquiry
are in order. First, my analysis centers on a particular subset of difficul-
ties- those arising from land use controls in private developments made
up of single-family residences. While portions of the analysis are more
broadly applicable to other types of private developments15 and to other
sorts of problems arising within them, this focal point provides a useful
means of illustrating and unpacking the relevant theoretical issues.
Second, this article does not set out to demonstrate the normative
inferiority, on balance, of covenant-based land use arrangements as
compared with zoning, nor of private developments as compared with
traditional neighborhoods. I make no claims about whether people are,
other things equal, more unhappy or more litigious in private develop-
ments than in traditional neighborhoods. Nor am I suggesting that the
difficulties of living together in a community are uniquely present in pri-
vate developments; indeed, most of the problems I discuss have ana-
logues in traditional neighborhoods. However, certain aspects of these
problems are presented more starkly in the private development context
than in traditional neighborhoods, and, more importantly, have not yet
received the theoretical attention that might lead to their amelioration.
My goal is to identify some unexplored and underexplored reasons why
private developments might fail to live up to the promise associated with
enhanced consumer choice and autonomy. Many of these problems may
be remedied by appropriate adjustments in the private arrangements and
in background legal rules. 6
Third, to focus my inquiry on the success of private development ar-
rangements for the parties involved, in this article I will consciously set
aside any discussion of the impact of the exclusion practiced by private
developments on those who are excluded and on society at large. Those
questions are important ones, but I am deferring them to a later day to
answer logically antecedent questions about the value and workability of
the private development arrangement for those who are in a position to
of its components.., all suggest that the CIC ownership vehicles will require substantial adjustment
and refinement well into the future.") (footnote omitted).
15. The cooperative ownership form both differs significantly from that of other common inter-
est communities and implicates different sets of legal and policy questions than those I discuss here.
Residents in housing cooperatives are shareholders in a corporation that holds title to the entire build-
ing and hold long-term leases rather than fee interests in their individual units. See WAYNE S. HYATT
& SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMON INTER-
EST COMMUNITIES 23 (1998).
16. See infra Part VI (providing some preliminary thoughts on possible ways of addressing these
problems).
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choose it. Until we understand how private developments work for those
who live in them and who presumably have the most to gain from them,
it is difficult to carefully frame any tradeoffs that might exist between the
interests of those inside the communities and those on the outside.
For similar reasons, this article does not provide any definitive pol-
icy proposals, although it does provide some concluding observations
about the prospects for resolving the problems I identify. This article
constitutes only one piece of what ultimately will be a larger inquiry. Be-
fore offering policy prescriptions or deciding what the role of the law
should be, it will be necessary to assess the role of externalities generated
by private developments, including the impact on those who are ex-
cluded. It might well be the case that the most direct methods of resolv-
ing the concerns discussed here, which are internal to private develop-
ments, would merely permit private developments to more easily
generate costly externalities. In other words, it will be necessary to put
together the interior view presented here with an exterior view of private
developments before saying anything definitive about the appropriate
direction for legal reform. This integration of internal and external views
also will be essential in answering larger questions of land use control,
such as the desirable respective roles of municipal and private control.
The analysis here proceeds in six parts. I begin by sketching the
conceptual underpinnings of private developments, after outlining some
of the relevant features of the legal landscape in which they are presently
multiplying. Part II examines the problems that arise from the fact that
servitudes are typically uniform-and uniformly enforced-across an en-
tire community. The inability of individuals to work out private deals
that would selectively release them from a given servitude is directly
analogous to the problems that are notorious in the zoning context. Part
III examines two dynamics that might push servitude regimes toward a
stricter convergence point than many individuals might desire: the inter-
action of numerous servitude regimes within the same metropolitan area
and the path dependence of community formation. Part IV considers
some additional obstacles to the realization of consumer preferences in
servitude regimes, including gaps in consumer understanding and diffi-
culties that consumers face in effectively sending market signals to de-
velopers. Part V considers the implications of a contract-based and asso-
ciation-administered regime for the development and deployment of
norms and social capital within a community. The argument here is that
the structural arrangements could get in the way of certain potentially
value-maximizing interactions. Part VI presents some concluding obser-
vations.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE DEVELOPMENTS
The concept of a private community controlled by servitudes dates
back to at least the eighteenth-century English practice of building a clus-
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ter of homes around a common square.17 While some common interest
developments appeared in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
in the United States, 18 most land use control in this country has been ac-
complished through zoning, an approach that swept the country begin-
ning in the 1910s. 19 In 1960, there were less than 500 homeowners asso-
ciations managing common property in the United States.' As of 2003,
there were an estimated 249,000 such communities.2 What is new, then,
is the prevalence of this form of private common ownership and its subtle
replacement of one regime of land use control with another, very differ-
ent system.
A. Contractual Justifications and Running Covenants
Servitudes differ from contracts in that they bind successors of the
original parties-that is, they "run with the land. 22  While this feature
historically caused servitudes to be viewed with judicial skepticism as
problematic restraints on alienation, the modern trend, beginning more
than a century and a half ago, has been to relax formal impediments to
servitude enforcement.' An increasing reliance on contract principles
and rhetoric accompanied this shift, as James Winokur explains:
17. See Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, History and Structure of the Common Interest
Community, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST, supra note 1, at 1, 7.
18. See id.; Gerald Korngold, The Emergence of Private Land Use Controls in Large-Scale Sub-
divisions: The Companion Story to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
617, 619-22 (2001) (discussing "community builders" of the early twentieth century and the covenant-
controlled community developed by the Van Sweringen brothers). Racially restrictive covenants be-
came common during the early part of the twentieth century. See Richard H. Chused, Euclid's His-
torical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 606 (2001). The Supreme Court held that racially re-
strictive zoning violated the Fourteenth Amendment in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917),
but signaled the validity of private restrictive covenants for this purpose several years later in Corrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), dismissing appeal from 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924). Homeowners as-
sociations with the sole purpose of enforcing racially restrictive covenants receded after 1948, when
the Supreme Court held in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), that judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants violated the Constitution. Barton & Silverman, supra note 17, at 9-10. But cf.
Richard W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions 12 (2002) (Inst. for Policy Research Working Paper
No. WP-02-03) (suggesting that unenforceable racially restrictive covenants continued to play a signal-
ing role for a significant period of time after Shelley), available at http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/
publications/papers/2002/WP-02-03.pdf.
19. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 213 (2001) (discussing rapid
spread of zoning after 1910); Ellickson, supra note 13, at 692 ("Today, zoning is virtually universal in
the metropolitan areas of the United States, where more than 97 percent of cities having a population
over 5,000 employ it.").
20. Barton & Silverman, supra note 17, at 10.
21. See CMTY. ASS'NS INST., supra note 2.
22. E.g., Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and
Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 215 (1992)
(explaining that "[u]nlike contractual rights, private land arrangements are enforceable by current and
future owners against current and future owners"); Reichman, supra note 6, at 279 (noting that servi-
tudes in residential associations "'run with the land' and bind subsequent purchasers").
23. For an historical overview of the law of servitudes, see, for example, Uriel Reichman, To-
ward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1982). See also Winokur, supra note 9,
at 4-5 ("Since the mid-nineteenth century, courts have liberalized doctrines that had once limited the
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Contract concepts were used to reconceptualize arrangements af-
fecting but not transferring possession, arrangements previously re-
jected as violating strict property principles. Promissory servitudes
restricting land use, earlier disdained in a property-dominated soci-
ety as title encumbrances hindering alienability, came to enjoy rec-
ognition in the service of an expanded, modem market in which
land-related contract obligations (alternatively conceived of as frac-
tionated property rights) were recognized as transferable commodi-
ties.24
The roots of this conceptual move towards contract can be traced
back to the 1848 English opinion, Tulk v. Moxhay,' the case that found a
servitude binding in equity on a successor landowner, despite the ab-
sence of horizontal privity.26 Characterizing the case as one of contract
enforcement, the court stated, "the question is, not whether the covenant
runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land
in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor,
and with notice of which he purchased." 7 Another significant data point
in the trend line is the 1929 case of Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co 8 This
case signaled a judicial shift from suspicion of covenants to a reconceptu-
alization and appreciation of their value-enhancing potential.29  The
Dixon court characterized the covenant as a contract that had been freely
accepted by the individual who purchased the land to which the covenant
was attached.3" The court treated the parties bound by the covenant like
any other contracting parties who had made a deal in order to achieve a
mutually beneficial result, concluding that "we see no reason for denying
the right of these parties to contract between themselves, the result of
such contracts... [being] to create a highly exclusive and valuable resi-
dential district." 31
This judicial move tracks the contractarian argument for recogniz-
ing covenants that run with the land. Gregory Alexander explains:
The standard explanation used to reconcile running covenants with
individual freedom is that a legal system that holds a subsequent
owner to a promise made by a predecessor is in fact enforcing pri-
vate intentions. The intentionalist model necessitates assuming that
enforceability of promissory servitudes between successors. More recently, commentators have urged
further liberalization and simplification.") (footnote omitted); id. at 11-16 (tracing historical develop-
ment of promissory servitudes).
24. Winokur, supra note 9, at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
25. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848); see also Winokur, supra note 9, at 13 (discussing Tulk).
26. Tulk, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1143.
27. Id. at 1144-45.
28. 166 N.E. 887 (Ohio 1929).
29. See Korngold, supra note 18, at 623 ("Dixon is an important milestone in de-demonizing real
covenants and in recognizing the value and importance of subdivision arrangements.").
30. See id. at 624.
31. Dixon, 166 N.E. at 892; see Korngold, supra note 18, at 624 (observing that "[u]nlike other
courts, the Dixon court treated real covenants like other contracts deserving of enforcement under the
concept of freedom of contract").
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the person who succeeded to the promisor's estate has assented to
the obligation even though he may never have expressed his con-
sent. The purchaser manifested her assent simply by purchasing
land subject to a discoverable obligation. The obligation is not law-
imposed but privately created, and the whole regime of land-use
obligations running with the land is thereby erected on the founda-
tion of free choice.32
Courts now consistently view servitudes as vehicles capable of facilitating
the autonomous choices of individuals and enhancing the value of land.33
B. Homeowners Associations and the Law
Using the law of servitudes as a starting point, courts, legislatures,
and bodies such as the American Law Institute and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have sought to shape and
define the legal terrain within private developments.34 In addition to
common law, there is a significant body of statutory law governing pri-
vate developments. Much legislation goes to broader questions of struc-
ture and governance,35 but some state statutes place specific substantive
limits on permissible use restrictions36 or set out presumptions regarding
restrictions and homeowner association actions.37 Federal statutes, such
32. Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
883,889 (1988).
33. Winokur, supra note 9, at 15 ("The perceived value-enhancing effect of servitudes is but-
tressed by the corollary perception that servitudes increase the liberty of landowners, allowing them
increased autonomy and control over their own assets.").
34. The American Law Institute recently completed the Third Restatement of Property, Servi-
tudes, which contains a substantial chapter devoted to common interest communities. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP: SERVITUDES, ch. 6 (2000). The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA), which was
originally enacted in 1982, and later amended in 1994. The 1982 version was adopted by six states
(Alaska, Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, West Virginia, and Connecticut), see UNI. COMMON INTER-
EST OWNERSHIP ACT (1982), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 1-2 (2002) (prefatory notes), and the 1994 version has
been adopted by Connecticut and Vermont, see UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT (1994), 7
pt. 1 U.L.A. (1997 & 2003 supp.) (prefatory notes). The UCIOA was designed to unify three previous
uniform laws addressing common interest forms of ownership: the Uniform Condominium Act, the
Uniform Planned Community Act, and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act. See 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
472 (1997) (prefatory note).
35. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 925 (5th ed. 2002) (describing how
nearly every state has a statute addressing the organization of common interest communities, requir-
ing, among other things, that governing rules be set out in a declaration and disclosed to purchasers).
36. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1360.5 (Deering Supp. 2001) (limiting the restrictions that
homeowners associations can place on pet ownership); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2242 (Supp. 2002)
(stating that no regulation, restriction, or covenant may impair the right of a unit owner to display an
American flag measuring up to three feet by five feet on a pole outside the unit); TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 5.025 (Vernon 1984) ("To the extent that a deed restriction applicable to a structure on resi-
dential property requires the use of a wood shingle roof, the restriction is void.").
37. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1354(a) (Deering Supp. 2001) (use restrictions set forth in the
recorded declaration are "enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable"); TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 202.004 (Vernon 1995) ("An exercise of discretionary authority by a property owners' associa-
tion or other representative designated by an owner of real property concerning a restrictive covenant
is presumed reasonable unless the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the exer-
cise of discretionary authority was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.").
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as the Fair Housing Act,38 impose additional substantive limits on servi-
tudes.
While a comprehensive survey of the present state of homeowners
association law is beyond the scope of this article, it is helpful to point
out a few features of the law in this area, beginning with a brief outline of
the typical process through which homeowners in a private community
become bound by servitudes on the land. In the usual case, a developer
drafts and records a master deed, also known as a declaration, which con-
tains a set of CC&Rs. These vary in content from development to devel-
opment, but often include deed restrictions that limit the uses to which
the property may be put. Restrictions designed to preserve certain aes-
thetic values, such as limits on paint color, yard art, structural changes,
fences, building materials, and the like are commonplace. Because the
content of the declaration is determined before any lots in the develop-
ment have been sold, homeowners purchase their homes with the com-
munity-wide deed restrictions already attached. These are servitudes
that run with the land, and thus they are binding not only on the original
set of homebuyers, but also on their successors. Changes in the CC&Rs
are possible not only through negotiated releases, but also through
amendment procedures set out in the declaration itself.39 New use re-
strictions can also be added as provided in the original declaration.' The
result is a two-tiered set of restrictions: those initially contained in the
CC&Rs that were part of the declaration and new restrictions adopted
later.4
Some courts have treated these two types of restrictions differ-
ently.42 The former are often treated as presumptively valid unless viola-
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2000).
39. Reichman, supra note 6, at 279 (explaining that residential private governments add to tradi-
tional property servitudes a grant of "comprehensive powers to the association" including, among
other things, "the right to impose new restrictions, amend or annul old ones, [and] apply and specify
the standards of existing restrictions (for example, architectural controls)").
40. Id. The association's power to make reasonable rules governing the use of property can also
be implied. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 (2000) (providing for implied
rulemaking powers except where inconsistent with statute or governing documents, but limiting the
scope of that power).
41. New restrictions can be further broken down into two different categories, based on the way
in which they were introduced: (1) through amendment of the original declaration, which typically
requires a supermajority vote; and (2) through enactment of new rules based on explicit or implicit
rule-making powers reserved to the homeowners association, which typically requires only action by
the governing board or a simple majority vote. The new Restatement treats these two categories of
new restrictions differently. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (2000)
(distinguishing "rules" from amendments to the declaration, and providing a rationale for the limits its
default rule places on the former).
42. See Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(distinguishing between these two categories of restrictions and observing that restrictions found in the
declaration "are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each
individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed"); see
also Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1283-84 (Cal. 1994) (noting this distinc-
tion). The new Restatement also draws a distinction between restrictions contained in the declaration
and later-enacted rules; it creates a default rule against new rules on use or occupancy of individual
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tive of public policy or otherwise shown to be arbitrary and without any
basis.43 Indeed, at least one court has taken the position that restrictions
in the declaration evincing a degree of unreasonableness would be up-
held." The reason for presumptive enforcement of these restrictions
arises out of the contract-based justification discussed above.45 Where
the purchaser had constructive notice of the restriction at the time of
purchase, as will be the case for the CC&Rs contained in the declaration,
the purchase is construed as consent to the restriction.46 Later-enacted
restrictions strain the contract analogy, because they can be enacted
without the consent-indeed over the objections-of a given unit
owner.47  Here, courts will usually apply a rule of reasonableness.'
Robert Natelson describes the differing approaches to the two sorts of
rules as follows:
When a complaining unit owner has approved an association deci-
sion by an act of effective consent, a court generally enforces the
decision without inquiry into its reasonableness. When the com-
plaining unit owner has not effectively consented, a court constructs
a hypothetical bargain, that is, it substitutes the rules of constructive
consent called reasonableness review. Reasonableness review is in-
formed by the same efficiency, unanimity, and compensation prin-
units that were not contained in the declaration, except to the extent those new restrictions apply to or
control impacts upon commonly owned property. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 6.7 (2000). The Restatement's default approach would, however, apparently permit amendments to
the declaration to introduce new restrictions. See supra note 41.
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (2000) (taking the posi-
tion that "[slervitudes included in the declaration are valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or against
public policy"); Brower, supra note 22, at 240-42 (discussing the high degree of deference that courts
afford original covenants in private developments).
44. See Hidden Harbour Estates, 393 So. 2d at 640 (explaining that "a use restriction in a declara-
tion of condominium may have a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in
the courts" and observing that otherwise owners would be unable to rely on these restrictions "since
such restrictions would be in a potential condition of continuous flux") (emphasis in original).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
46. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 22, at 216 ("[S]tate disclosure laws and real estate policies mean
that each homeowner essentially is entering into an original consensual transaction with neighbors and
the residential association.... Therefore, consent, rather than land ownership or status, is the key to
servitude enforcement."); see also infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' ana-
lytic focus on consent).
47. One can, of course, argue that even those who are outvoted with regard to a given change
still "consented" to it because, by entering the community (or failing to leave it), they agreed to be
bound by the development's procedures for making changes. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 22, at 243
(discussing this argument); Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments,
77 B.U. L. REv. 273. 274, 282 (1997) (describing this view). On this reasoning, however, implied con-
sent to all outcomes generated by a known political process would also be present whenever a person
chooses to enter (or decides not to exit) any political subdivision. See infra note 87 (discussing signifi-
cance of consent-based distinctions between cities and private developments).
48. Some jurisdictions apply a "business judgment rule" rather than a reasonableness test in re-
viewing the actions of board members. See Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553
N.E.2d 1317, 1321-23 (N.Y. 1990) (adopting a business judgment rule in reviewing cooperative board's
actions with respect to a kitchen renovation).
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ciples that inform certain other areas of private law in situations in
which genuine consent is not practicable.49
Enforcement of use restrictions and other matters of association govern-
ance are handled by the association's managing board.5" This approach
facilitates the enforcement of covenants in private developments by solv-
ing the collective action problem that otherwise would exist if individual
landowners were left responsible for enforcement.5
An association's failure to enforce a given servitude in one setting
may weaken its ability to enforce the same servitude in another setting.
52
Although framed in various ways, this principle shows up with some
regularity in decided cases. For example, covenants may be deemed
abandoned through nonenforcement, such that they will not be en-
forced. 53 Alternatively, enforcement in a community may be deemed so
49. Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and "Reasonableness" in Private Law: The Special
Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 87 (1990).
50. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS § 3.5.1, at 101-03
(1989) (describing powers and duties of the managing board); see also Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n,
Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that a homeowners association
could sue to enforce covenants within the development, despite the fact that the association owned no
land and was not in privity of estate with any party benefited by the covenants); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.8 cmt. a (1998) (noting that historical doubts about the ability of a
homeowners association to enforce servitudes without owning benefited land "have long been re-
solved" in favor of allowing such enforcement).
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.8 cmt. a (1998) (explaining that
"collective enforcement by the community is one of the chief benefits of owning property in a com-
mon-interest community" because "[tihe association is able to spread the costs of enforcement over
the entire community"); Nelson, supra note 8, at 832 (explaining that "[e]nforcement of covenants to
protect the quality of existing neighborhoods often proved unreliable, because no one entity was re-
sponsible for bringing the necessary legal actions. Collective private ownership provided the devel-
oper a way of overcoming the free rider problem."); infra note 226 and accompanying text (further
discussing the free rider problem solved through centralized enforcement).
52. See, e.g., HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 15, § 8.04(A)-(C) (presenting materials on defenses
of arbitrary application, selective enforcement, and waiver); Hyatt, supra note 8, at 51-52 (discussing
role of formalism and a variety of judicial doctrines in perpetuating the belief that community associa-
tions must enforce rules to avoid setting a bad precedent); Jay Weiser, The Real Estate Covenant as
Commons: Incomplete Contract Remedies over Time, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 269, 288-89 (2004)
(discussing doctrines that create pressure toward rigid covenant enforcement); Amos B. Elberg, Note,
Remedies for Common Interest Development Rule Violations, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1958, 1987 & n.170
(2001) (discussing the possibility that nonenforcement will lead to waiver, and citing cases). But see
Katharine N. Rosenberry, Home Businesses, Llamas and Aluminum Siding: Trends in Covenant En-
forcement, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 443, 477-78 (1998) (observing that courts are less likely to find
waiver when unenforced violations are few or distinguishable, especially if a provision in the governing
documents recites that nonenforcement does not constitute waiver); Elberg, supra, at 1987 n.170 (not-
ing that waiver is alleged much more often than it is found). Doctrines that cause legal entitlements to
"erode" when encroachments upon those entitlements go unenforced are not unique to covenants;
they appear in a variety of contexts. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Erosion of Rights by Past Breach, 1
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190 (1999) (presenting examples from a number of doctrinal contexts and ana-
lyzing the impact of such erosion doctrines). Requiring people to enforce their rights or risk losing
those rights has the effect of raising the stakes associated with minor violations far beyond the actual
costs associated with those violations, thereby increasing the amount that the rightholder will be will-
ing to spend on enforcement. See id. at 192-93 (describing this dynamic).
53. See Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tydings, 864 P.2d 392, 396-97 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (discussing standards for finding a covenant abandoned, and concluding that those stan-
dards were not met in the case at hand).
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arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an affirmative defense to an en-
forcement action. 4 Finally, past patterns of enforcement may bear on
the interpretation of some of the more subjective and malleable stan-
dards, such as "architectural uniformity."55 These doctrines help to fuel
association fears of creating an unfavorable precedent by forgoing en-
forcement in a given instance. 6 Therefore, homeowners associations
may feel pressure to enforce all association rules in order to preserve the
right of enforcement in the future. 7
C. Conceptualizing the Private Development
Private developments involve an interesting mix of private ordering
through covenants and collective ordering through the private develop-
ment's governance structure, set against a backdrop of public law that in-
cludes familiar features such as zoning ordinances, building codes, and
nuisance law. Now that some of the legal features accompanying this
form of ownership have been outlined, a conceptual sketch can be at-
tempted.
There are at least three types of gains that people might seek to
achieve in a private development. First, they might desire the gains that
accompany the collective ownership and management of common prop-
erty. 8 The private development might include amenities and facilities
54. See Southland Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Myles, 555 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
homeowner who added a second driveway without approval was deemed to have made out an affirma-
tive defense by identifying other second driveways in the neighborhood, as well as other stylistic in-
consistencies).
55. See Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 740 P.2d 668, 671 (Mont. 1987) (holding that
"harmony of external design" was an impermissibly vague standard upon which to base disapproval of
building plans where community exhibited "a cacophony of styles").
56. See, e.g., KENNETH BUDD, BE REASONABLE! 74 (1998) ("For nearly 30 years, since develop-
ers formed the first condominium and homeowner associations, boards of directors-and many attor-
neys-have clung to a sacred yet unwritten belief: thou shalt enforce every rule. Make one exception
to the architectural covenants, let one homeowner violate a restriction, and the result will be chaos.
Members will rebuild cars on their balconies, they'll fill their yards with garden gnomes and old wash-
ing machines. they'll let packs of wild animals roam the streets."); Hyatt, supra note 14, at 314 ("Much
enforcement litigation is the result of the unwillingness of the association manager and attorney to
refrain from enforcing association rules for fear of setting 'a precedent."').
57. At least some official advice to homeowners associations has carried this message. See
MCKENZIE, supra note 11, at 131 (stating that under "the conventional professional wisdom regarding
rule enforcement .... [bloard members are routinely advised to be extremely aggressive and inflexible
in the enforcement of CC&Rs"). But see BUDD, supra note 56, at 38-40 (discussing possible circum-
stances in which a well-documented exception to enforcement might be advisable, while noting the
risks that can accompanying nonenforcement); DONALD R. STABILE, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
THE EMERGENCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF A QUIET INNOVATION IN HOUSING 192-93, 215 (2000) (de-
scribing the shift in philosophy within the Community Association Institute, beginning around 1995,
from advocacy of strict enforcement of rules to a new emphasis on flexibility). In an effort to counter
overzealous enforcement pressures, the new Restatement has set a high standard for a showing of
waiver. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.3(2) & cmt. f, at 502 (2000).
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, ch. 6, introductory note (2000)
(noting that one reason for the popularity of common interest communities is "their ability to increase
the amenities available to residents by providing a workable mechanism for sharing enjoyment and
spreading the costs across a stable base of contributors"); Brower, supra note 22, at 205 (observing
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(for example, a golf course, a swimming pool, tennis courts, a clubhouse)
that are valued by the members of the development, but which none of
them would find it worthwhile to fund and manage on their own. I will
largely set this interest to one side in the discussion that follows, as it is
conceptually indistinguishable from the formation of a private club for
purposes of providing collective amenities.
The second kind of potential gain in private developments is social
or associational in nature.59 One way of achieving this gain might be
through covenants that serve a population-screening function, as op-
posed to merely a behavior-screening function.' For example, a private
development may provide a mechanism for clustering by socioeconomic
status and may, therefore, promote a level of homogeneity yielding a va-
riety of effects.6" In addition, a private development might foster com-
munity by providing a cohesive sense of neighborhood identity or by
providing concrete opportunities for community-building interactions,
either through the governance structure or through the use and enjoy-
ment of common areas and amenities.62 As noted at the outset, the dy-
namics of exclusion and the impact on the excluded consciously are set
aside in this article.63 However, the implications of the governance struc-
ture and covenant enforcement regime for the prospects of community
building will be explored at some length later in the article.'
Third, individuals entering private developments often seek to real-
ize gains associated with the reciprocal control of land use.65 While there
that the advantages associated with residential associations include "amenities such as parks, swim-
ming pools, and clubhouses"); Nelson, supra note 8, at 832 (explaining that "[clollective ownership...
allowed developers to provide common recreational and other facilities that new housing owners in-
creasingly demanded").
59. See Brower, supra note 22, at 206 (identifying protection of "social or life-style preferences"
as among the goals of the rules governing common interest developments); Gillette, supra note 10, at
1396-97 (suggesting that "covenants have the capacity to form a basis of association for those who
share a view of the good life").
60. See Ellickson, supra note 13, at 751 (suggesting the possibility that some uses, such as mobile
homes, are disfavored because they are associated with people of lower socioeconomic status); Gil-
lette, supra note 10, at 1396-97 (discussing the possibility that the land uses prohibited by covenants
might serve as proxies for personal characteristics or propensities that are deemed undesirable).
61. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1394-97 (observing ways that private developments might fos-
ter homogeneity). Efforts to achieve socioeconomic homogeneity in housing is not, of course, limited
to private developments. See id. at 1397-98 (discussing the sorting by income and wealth that occurs
in communities even in the absence of covenants).
62. See, e.g., FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES 97 (1994) (positing
that democracy in a residential community "can foster a sense of community and induce volunteer
efforts"); infra note 290 and accompanying text.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
64. See infra Part V.
65. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, ch. 6, introductory note (1998)
(observing that one advantage of common interest communities inheres in "the mechanism they pro-
vide for controlling the community environment" through means such as rules, design controls, and
servitudes); Ellickson, supra note 13, at 712-13 (discussing covenants as a device for achieving im-
provements in the allocation of land use rights between neighbors); Uriel Reichman, Judicial Supervi-
sion of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 144 (1978) (discussing the use of servitudes to coordinate
land uses for maximum efficiency).
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might be any number of land use controls in a given development, their
unifying purpose, I posit, is the production of a local public good that we
might call "premium ambience."'  The word "premium" in this formula-
tion signifies both that the quality of ambience sought in such develop-
ments represents a subjectively valuable step beyond that which would
prevail under existing principles of nuisance and zoning law, and also
that this step is a purchased one-it comes, quite literally, at a premium.67
Those seeking to secure premium ambience might desire to consume it
themselves, but they also may be motivated by the belief that this local
public good will be capitalized into the resale price of their homes.' This
third sort of gain arising from the production of premium ambience
within private developments, will be the primary focus of this article.
Residents in private developments purchase premium ambience by
ceding property rights of their own, both directly through acceptance of
reciprocal restrictions on their own land, and indirectly through the in-
stallation of a governance regime with the power to alter and enforce the
prevailing land use controls.69 A stylized example will help break apart
the work done by the covenants themselves, on the one hand, and the
governance structure on the other.70 Imagine a group of ten people con-
sidering buying houses in the same block. Each landowner attaches
some value to the ability to place items of her own choosing in her own
front yard but believes that, in general, objects placed in the front yard
detract from the neighborhood's ambience. If each piece of yard art
brings $100 worth of benefits to its displayer but imposes $200 worth of
costs on the group-that is, $20 worth of aesthetic dismay or reduced
property value borne by each resident-then people would be expected
to put out "too much" yard art because they internalize the full benefit
without bearing the full cost.71 There is a possible gain from trade in this
setting. In exchange for giving up the privilege of displaying each item of
yard art, a privilege that is worth $80 net per item, a homeowner in the
66. A "public good" in the economic sense is one that exhibits nonrivalry of consumption and
nonexcludability of benefits. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNAL-
ITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986). A "local public good" is a public good "whose
benefits involve only a small jurisdiction such as a municipality or town." Id. at 24.
67. I use the phrase "premium ambience" as a generic term. Members of different private de-
velopments will have different ideas of the sort of premium ambience they wish to seek through con-
trols on land use and will adjust the content of the controls accordingly. One confounding possibility,
which I will simply note for present purposes, is that a central component of the ambience some peo-
ple seek in private communities is the presence or absence of certain sorts of other people.
68. See FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 45-46 (discussing studies showing evidence of capitalization of
"location characteristics" into home values); see also Brower, supra note 22, at 205 (maintaining that a
traditional goal of rules in common interest developments is "to protect investment-backed expecta-
tions"); infra note 169 (property value preservation as a motivation for covenants).
69. See Reichman, supra note 6, at 279-80, 303 n.192 (discussing the interaction between servi-
tudes and the private governance regime in a private residential community).
70. This dichotomy is something of a simplification, as the two components interact with each
other.
71. This is a standard "tragedy of the commons" scenario. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
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community could obtain similar surrenders from the other residents and
thereby be shielded from $180 of potential costs in the form of yard art
displayed by others. Land use covenants reciprocally binding all resi-
dents to forbear from yard art therefore would provide gains to all of the
residents under these assumptions.72
It is true of course that someone who netted more than $180 in
benefits associated with displaying yard art would not enjoy any gains
from trade and would, therefore, not be expected to enter into such a
covenant arrangement. On the other hand, some people derive no net
benefit from displaying tacky yard art. For them, entering into the
agreement requires surrendering nothing of value; the covenant does not
act to restrain any behavior that they would otherwise choose to take.
Between these two groups are those who would display tacky yard art in
the absence of the covenant, but for whom the covenant is more valuable
than the right to display the yard art. The "no yard art" covenant pro-
vides a convenient way of drawing together those for whom such a cove-
nant would represent a gain and delivering that gain to them, while
screening out those for whom such a covenant would represent a loss.
The move of agreeing to such a reciprocal covenant effects a shift of
property rights from the individual to the individual's neighbors, while
delivering to the individual some of the property rights originally held by
the neighbors. Even before the shift, some rights with respect to the use
of an individual's land were already held by the community under back-
ground principles of nuisance law and, typically, zoning restrictions.73 As
additional rights over the use of privately owned property are transferred
from the individual to the community, the individual's rights over the use
of her own property shrink accordingly. The compensation for this dimi-
nution comes in the form of additional rights over the use of the property
of others within the neighborhood.74 Presumably, everyone making such
a trade views it as a worthwhile one; the expanded control over the prop-
erty of others more than compensates for the diminished control over
one's own property.
Figure 1 provides a stylized representation of such an exchange in a
two-person community. The two squares represent the original property
rights, as conditioned by existing law, that two homeowners would have
in a piece of residential property. Each homeowner agrees to slice away
72. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 19 (1989) ("Capturing a por-
tion of the aggregate gains from mitigating common pool losses is a primary motivating force for indi-
viduals to bargain to install or to modify property rights arrangements.").
73. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 343 fig.9.1 (1995) (illustrating the
various ways that land use entitlements might be divided between the landowner and the community);
Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1,
18 fig.1, 19-20 (2000).
74. Reichman, supra note 6, at 281 ("By purchasing a home in a residential private government
community, the owner waives part of the incidents of his title; he is compensated for this diminution of
his rights, however, by the generally improved living conditions and the extra services provided for all
the members of the community.").
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some of those rights and give them to the other homeowner in exchange
for receiving the same set of rights from the other homeowner. The
FIGURE 1:
Two-HOUSEHOLD BARGAINS
lower portion of Figure 1 compares the original property rights, repre-
sented by the square, with the newly reshaped property rights, repre-
sented by the parallelogram, and shows the resulting gain and loss to the
homeowner. The rights obtained from the other party, represented by
the gray triangle on the right-hand side, are presumably more valuable
than those given up, represented by the white triangle on the left. That
surplus represents the gain from trade that corresponds to the generation
of the local public good of premium ambience.
In this simple two-household bargaining scenario, each household
receives the entire slice of rights given up by the other party, and likewise
gives up its own slice of surrendered rights to just one party. In a multi-
ple-household bargaining scenario, the rights surrendered by any given
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homeowner are dispersed among a number of other homeowners, while
that same individual receives rights over the land use of a number of
other homeowners. Figure 2 illustrates this. A given landowner, Ada,
surrenders the rights represented by the triangular area on the left to the
other members of the community. Each of the small squares represents a
veto power over her activities on her land, and each of these activity-
blocking entitlements goes out to a different neighbor. Likewise, the tri-
angle on the right is made up of the individual property rights surren-
dered to Ada by each other member of the community. Each small
square represents a veto right that she gains over the land-use activities
of given neighbor.
FIGURE 2:
BARGAINING IN A LARGER COMMUNITY
t. Ada
property rights dispersed
to and received from each
other member of the
community
Because the developer is able to act as a central locus for forming
these reciprocally binding covenants, transaction costs for bargains of the
sort depicted in Figure 2 are quite low.75 Ada is able to alienate property
rights to dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of other individuals, while
simultaneously receiving property rights from the same number in ex-
change, simply by purchasing a lot in a private development that is sub-
ject to a particular set of CC&Rs.
Undoing the deal is obviously much harder, at least in the absence
of a governance structure capable of realigning rights without unanimous
consent. Should Ada wish to reclaim an entitlement already alienated,
such as the ability to display yard art, she must cobble the lost entitle-
ment together by repurchasing the right to display yard art from each of
the many community members to whom it was alienated. Because she
needs the full triangle on the left to engage in the action in question, each
75. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 914-15 (1988)
(noting the efficiency of this arrangement).
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of her neighbors holds a veto. In a community of any significant size, the
transaction costs, including holdout problems, are likely to make obtain-
ing releases from a given servitude from all other community members a
logistical impossibility, even when doing so would be efficient.76 Every
member of the community faces the same difficulty in assembling the
rights necessary to engage in activities prohibited by covenant. The re-
sulting situation has the structure of an anticommons.77 Every commu-
nity member has a right to exclude every other community member from
making forbidden incursions into the aesthetic space cleared by the
covenants, with the result that even efficient entries into that forbidden
space are unlikely to occur.78 That cleared aesthetic space may, there-
fore, generate a level of premium ambience that is inefficiently high.
Yet even as the covenant scheme in a private development creates a
problem of fragmentation, it also solves another problem that could be
similarly characterized as one of fragmentation, although it has not tradi-
tionally been thought of in those terms.79 When Ada disperses land use
rights to her neighbors, she also collects rights over neighborhood aes-
thetics from each of them. That process of collection can be understood
as bringing together in Ada's hands something that was previously frag-
mented among the neighbors-power to control certain aspects of
neighborhood aesthetics. Before Ada can personally and decisively ex-
76. See, e.g., Elberg, supra note 52, at 1981-83 (noting the difficulty a homeowner faces in at-
tempting to obtain unanimous consent to a servitude release).
77. The anticommons was originally conceptualized as a resource that everyone had the power
to exclude everyone else from using, but that nobody had the power to use without the permission of
everyone else. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 n.22 (1993); Frank
I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 3, 6, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982). The anticommons notion was
later reformulated to cover a range of real world situations involving veto powers held by limited
numbers of people. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transi-
tion from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 668 (1998). While questions remain about the
contours of the concept, see Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907
(2004) (arguing for a functional distinction between commons and anticommons that eschews the dis-
tinguishing criteria currently in use), an anticommons situation is plainly presented when an individual
who highly values a particular resource is unable to assemble the fragmented entitlements necessary to
make use of that resource.
An anticommons need not inevitably produce inefficiencies. See Heller, supra, at 673-76 (discuss-
ing nontragic anticommons, and suggesting that a developer's use of restrictive covenants "to convert
raw land to anticommons form can be an efficiency-enhancing move"). The possibility that common
interest communities might present an anticommons problem by locking in suboptimal entitlement
allocations was recognized in Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1185 (1999) [hereinafter Heller, Boundaries.]
78. Cf. James Buchanan, The Institutional Structure of Externality, in 15 COLLECrED WORKS OF
JAMES BUCHANAN: EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE THEORY 174, 179 (2001) (observing
potential for too few straying cattle in a setting featuring many ranchers and many farmers, where each
farmer has the power to withhold permission to allow a given rancher's cattle to stray; "[tlhis possible
tendency toward an underproduction of the externality-generating good or service is the central flaw
in the proposals to resolve environmental quality problems by the creation and assignment of new
'amenity rights' to citizens").
79. In other words, before we can know what counts as fragmentation, we need to have some
idea of what constitutes a unified whole. For a discussion of historical principles of unity in property,
see Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 595, 603-10 (2002).
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ercise control over the aspects of neighborhood ambience that the
neighbors severally hold entitlements to affect, she must gather together
in her own hands all of those entitlements.
The private development form of ownership provides a neat solu-
tion to this latter form of fragmentation, while leaving unresolved the
fragmentation problem that results from the alienation of use rights to
many neighbors.8° Of course, private developments are more than just a
collection of people holding reciprocally binding covenants-there is
typically also a governance regime capable of realigning property rights
on less than unanimous consent.8 This eases in some measure the con-
cerns just described, even as it introduces some new complications. The
homeowners association generally has the power to change the original
covenants, add new rules, remove old rules, interpret the prevailing rules,
and make enforcement decisions. People in private developments, then,
are not just opting for private ordering in the form of covenants, but also
are opting for a privatized form of collective decision making that can
undo, replace, modify, or augment the private ordering already achieved.
A private governance regime that can make changes on less than
unanimous consent delivers a measure of flexibility to the members of
the community and might help achieve the community's collective goals.
These gains come at a price: a risk that decisions adverse to the individ-
ual homeowner will be made.82 Two kinds of entitlements are put into
jeopardy when a landowner cedes control to a collective decision-making
body capable of acting on less than unanimous consent: first, the land-
owner's entitlements in her own property that remained reserved to her
after the reciprocal exchange of covenants (the white area shown in Fig-
ure 2); and, second, the set of servitudes governing other people's land
that each landowner received in the reciprocal exchange (the cross-
80. Because of this article's internal focus on private developments, I will not elaborate on the
fragmentation of neighborhood environment rights that exists in ordinary neighborhoods. Such con-
cerns would be critically important in making judgments between forms of land use control and, there-
fore, must be taken into account in the larger project of which this article forms one component. In
addition, any solutions for overcoming the fragmentation problem associated with alienation of use
rights in a private development may threaten or weaken the property rule protection granted to the
newly assembled rights over the neighborhood environment. The two kinds of fragmentation are mir-
ror images of each other; one can only be overcome at the expense of the other. See Fennell, supra
note 77, at 966-71 (discussing this point in greater detail).
81. E.g., Reichman, supra note 6, at 274 (discussing the ability of homeowners associations to
make changes on majority or supermajority vote); id. at 281 ("[Ilt would be intolerable if one owner
could veto all regulatory changes (as he could with regular servitudes)."); ROBERT H. NELSON, PRI-
VATE NEIGHBORHOODS: A REVOLUTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (forthcoming 2005, Urban Insti-
tute Press) (Sept. 2003 manuscript, Introduction at 16) (observing that most private developments'
governing documents do not require unanimous consent for most amendments); id., ch. 4, at 10-12,
(noting that amendment of the community "constitution" typically requires a supermajority, but not
unanimous consent).
82. By turning decisions over to collective control on anything less than unanimous consent, an
individual risks harm from decisions adverse to that individual's interests, but these risks may be justi-
fied by the cost savings achieved in reaching decisions. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962),
reprinted as 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 65-73 (Liberty Fund 1999).
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hatched triangular area on the right in Figure 2). Various constraints,
whether contained in the development's declaration itself or implied
through the operation of law, may be placed on the collectivity's ability
to intrude on these sets of property rights, yet the collective is likely to
have power to transfer some of the individual landowner's entitlements
to the collective or back to their previous owners against the landowner's
will.
If covenants that were the basis of reciprocal gains from trade may
be altered or replicated through collective decision making, then one
might question why the covenants were necessary at all. The set of
CC&Rs that each new member agrees to upon entry is not insignificant,
of course. As noted above, the idea that these CC&Rs have received
unanimous consent in the form of home purchase leads to higher levels
of judicial deference than for later-enacted rules. 83 The original CC&Rs
also endow residents with rights that may become entrenched over time,
and could provide a baseline against which compensation might be made
for changes.' In addition to providing the default rules against which
this new form of privatized collective action takes place, the original
CC&Rs might be expected to provide valuable information to would-be
homebuyers about what is valued by the members of the community that
the homebuyer may potentially join. In other words, the original cove-
nants would ideally serve both information and coordination functions in
assembling like-minded members of new collective decision-making
units, as well as substantively operating to control the use of land.'
By bringing together a community of people for whom the original
covenants secure gains from trade and providing them with a private self-
governance mechanism, the private development might seem to offer an
ideal vehicle for delivering on consumer preferences. Why, then, does it
appear that people are not always able to get what they want in private
communities?
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNIFORM RULES
The first reason why consumers might be unable to get what they
want in private developments is inherent in the reciprocal, community-
wide structure of the covenants and the uniform manner in which they
tend to be enforced. Typically, the CC&Rs in a given community apply
across the board and cannot be selectively modified for an individual
homeowner, unless that homeowner secures a release from every
neighbor benefited by a given covenant. It is true that a homeowner un-
83. See supra text accompanying notes-22-23.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 129-32 (discussing use of a Takings Clause analogue in
private developments).
85. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1394-95 (describing how covenants in private communities
facilitate signaling and coordination among those with similar tastes).
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happy with the rules can try to gain sufficient political power to get the
rule globally changed through the homeowners association, but this, as
we shall see, does not change the basic problem of uniform rules.86
This problem of uniform rules is not unique to the homeowners as-
sociation setting. Instead, I describe a basic problem associated with
rulemaking in a heterogeneous society in which people have varying
preferences. Unless people with sufficiently strong preferences about a
given rule are able to bargain with the other members of the community
for an exemption or otherwise translate the strength of their preferences
into political outcomes, the rule is likely to operate inefficiently with re-
gard to at least some of the population." This is just as true in the case of
zoning and other forms of majoritarian rulemaking as it is in the case of
private restrictive covenants. Yet, the problem of uniform rules is par-
ticularly significant in the homeowners association setting for three rea-
sons.
First, this foundational problem has received surprisingly little at-
tention in this context, perhaps because of the presumed greater degree
of choice and consent involved in entry into a private development in the
first place." Therefore, simply observing the presence of the problem in
this arena and setting out its precise nature is useful. Second, the prob-
lems associated with uniform rules may be particularly troubling in the
private development setting, given the reduced constraints on private
86. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. I am using the term "rules" broadly and gen-
erically here to encompass use restrictions contained in covenants. The term is sometimes used in a
more specialized way in this context. See, e.g., supra note 41 (noting the Restatement's distinction be-
tween "rules" and declaration provisions).
87. See, e.g., E.J. Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 255, 259-61
(1967) (presenting a numeric example involving heterogeneous individuals in which a majority rule
will produce suboptimal results, and in which Pareto superior arrangements can be reached through
weighted voting or bargaining); Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and
Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 840-42 (1973) (discussing Mishan's example and its implications for gen-
eral rules).
Consensus-based models of decision making can incorporate the relative strength of preferences
into the process, if parties defer on issues about which they care little and gain the deference of others
to their own strongly held views. See Mark Fenster, Community by Covenant, Process, and Design:
Cohousing and the Contemporary Common Interest Community, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3, 13-14
(1999) (describing the consensus model of decision making in cohousing groups, where hand signals or
color-coded cards are used to indicate strength and direction of preferences, often augmented by a
"fallback" system of majority or supermajority voting should a group reach impasse). Other mecha-
nisms for incorporating strengths of preferences into community voting systems have been explored in,
e.g., Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1546-47; NELSON, supra note 81, ch. 15.
88. See, e.g., FOLDVARY, supra note 62, at 60 (contrasting "explicit" contractual consent that
accompanies entry into private community with "simply living in or even entering into a sovereign
community" which, he argues, "does not imply any agreement with all its rules or its constitution");
Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1520, 1523 (distinguishing public and private communities based on "per-
fect" voluntariness in the latter). But see Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Re-
ply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589, 1590-91 (1982) (questioning this distinction, and noting that some cities
were originally formed through the voluntary actions of residents); Nelson, supra note 8, at 861 (ob-
serving that residents of both municipalities and homeowners associations enter voluntarily, and sug-




governance and the generally more intrusive nature of the restrictions
themselves.89 If we have reason to believe that the content of the cove-
nants arises through a process that is not particularly responsive to con-
sumer preferences, or that preferences move out of alignment with the
rules over time,' then the argument from consumer sovereignty does not
dispel these concerns.
Finally, many of the considerations that can inhibit flexible adjust-
ment of rules in public settings, such as concerns about "selling" the po-
lice power to the highest bidder,9' are absent in private development set-
tings where the rules in question are the work of private bargains, rather
than the exercise of the police power.' Private developments, then,
would seem to offer an ideal setting for examining and testing flexible re-
sponses to the problems associated with uniform rules.93 Yet it appears
very little experimentation of this nature has occurred.94 It is worth ask-
ing why that is the case. The reasons for this lack of innovation seem to
be partly the result of inertia and inexperience and partly the result of
specific features of the legal landscape in which homeowners associations
operate.'
89. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 22, at 218-19 (providing a list of the sorts of items and activities
regulated in homeowners association neighborhoods); Gillette, supra note 10, at 1384 (noting that
covenants can impose greater restrictions than would be imposed under common law or local ordi-
nances); Nelson, supra note 2, at 159-60 (describing the larger scope and greater detail of private regu-
lation, as compared with zoning); Reichman, supra note 6, at 269-75 (detailing the ways in which resi-
dential private communities curtail traditional property rights); id. at 274 (observing that "the
homeowners' organization claims to possess at least the same powers that municipalities have-
without the concomitant limitations of public law"); A. Dan Tarlock, Residential Community Associa-
tions and Land Use Controls, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 75, 78 (Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations
ed., 1989) (noting both the heightened level of control over residential land use and behavior in resi-
dential community association neighborhoods and the possibility that a member in one of these com-
munities "may have less protection against arbitrary actions than a citizen of a general purpose gov-
ernment"); infra note 209 and accompanying text (referencing arguments concerning the applicability
of constitutional protections within homeowners associations).
90. See infra Parts II.C-IV.
91. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 73, at 25-26 & n.97 (discussing this point); William A. Fischel,
Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Zoning Reform, 27 PUB. POL'Y 301, 327 (1979) ("Selling zoning, as
long as this [police power] rationale persists, is analogous to selling health inspections to restaurants,
elevator safety certification to apartment houses, and licenses to speed to automobile operators.").
92. Nelson, supra note 2, at 173.
93. See NELSON, supra note 81, Preface, at 12 (making this observation); id., Part V (discussing
possible directions for innovation).
94. Id., Preface, at 12, Introduction to Part V, at 4.
95. See Hyatt, supra note 8, at 53 (observing role of "institutional inertia" in perpetuating pat-
terns of behavior in common interest communities). There are practical limits to innovation, to be
sure. See id. at 47 (observing that "any evolution in community association formation and operation
must not be so daring as to make developments unmarketable, nor should the evolution be so complex
as to make projects unmanageable"). Because innovation is costly and risky, developers would only
be expected to experiment with new approaches when the expected internalized gains exceed the ex-
pected costs associated with the innovation. See Weiser, supra note 52, at 299 (discussing conditions
under which developer innovation would be expected). If innovators are unable to capture the full
value of their innovation because successful approaches can simply be copied by others without pay-
ment, then we might expect to see inefficiently low levels of innovation. However, if governance inno-
vations can be protected as intellectual property so that the gains of innovation are assigned to the
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A. Common Pools and Blunt Tools
The collective-action problem to which servitudes respond, as well
as the signature difficulty associated with uniform, community-wide rules
for controlling this collective-action problem, can be demonstrated with a
simple example. Imagine a community in which a particular phenome-
non-say, the presence of concrete gnomes-is costly to the community
as a whole in terms of aesthetic disutility or falling property values. Indi-
vidual homeowners who derive benefits from displaying gnomes in their
front yards may display gnomes to an inefficient extent because they only
internalize a fraction of the cost associated with gnome display. For ex-
ample, Astrid might derive a benefit of $100 from displaying a gnome in
her front yard, but a gnome might impose $500 in total costs on her 100-
person community. Because Astrid bears only 1/100 of those costs, she
will choose to display the gnome, even though this is not efficient. A
gnome-forbidding rule would lead to an efficient result in Astrid's case.
Next consider Beasley, who derives a benefit of $600 from gnome
display. The gnome-forbidding rule leads to an inefficient result in
Beasley's case. Yet a community that must write a uniform rule regard-
ing gnomes applicable to both Astrid and Beasley will choose to forbid
the gnomes. Two gnomes will cost the community $1000, while the
benefits derived by both Astrid and Beasley total only $700. Signifi-
cantly, it is not so easy for Beasley to negotiate with the rest of the com-
munity to buy the right to display the gnome. Because there are ninety-
nine neighbors holding servitudes that prohibit Beasley's gnome display,
purchasing releases is likely to be impossible. Beasley is also unlikely to
succeed in the political arena of the homeowners association if his ex-
treme gnome appreciation is unusual in his community.' A different sort
of mechanism, such as a gnome tax, would offer a plausible way to force
people to internalize the costs of their gnome-related behavior. How-
ever, setting the tax is difficult, especially if we suspect that there is an in-
creasing marginal cost associated with additional gnomes-that is, the
addition of a tenth gnome harms the community more than the addition
of the first gnome.
Some additional dimensions of the problems associated with using
uniform rules to regulate the neighborhood environment can be illus-
innovator, then more innovation might be expected. Cf. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293
F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (addressing the question of copyright protection for model building
codes); id. at 824 (Weiner, J., dissenting) (stating that internet posting of model codes enacted into law
could deprive the drafting organization "of income used in its socially valuable efforts of confecting,
promulgating, and revising model codes"). I thank John Duffy for bringing this line of inquiry to my
attention.
96. A simple majority or supermajority vote does not register differences in strengths of prefer-
ences. Thus, one individual with a strong preference for a given rule can (and usually will, in the ab-
sence of side payments or logrolling) be outvoted by two or more individuals with relatively trivial
preferences for the opposite rule. See, e.g., Mishan, supra note 87, at 259-60 (presenting a numeric
example illustrating this point).
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trated by considering a stylized example involving a much simpler com-
mon-pool resource: fish. Imagine a fishing area containing three kinds
of fish (Redfish, Bluefish, and Yellowfish) that is owned communally by
three people (Ronald, Beth, and Yves). Due to differential skills and
preferences, the benefits derived from catching a given type of fish vary
from individual to individual, as follows:
TABLE 1
MARGINAL BENEFITS (BY FISHER AND TYPE OF FISH)
Redfish Bluefish Yellowfish
Ronald $50 $10 $10
Beth $10 $50 $10
Yves $10 $10 $50
Thus, Ronald derives benefits of $50 from each Redfish, but only
derives benefits of $10 from each Bluefish or Yellowfish. Beth derives
benefits of $50 from each Bluefish, but only $10 from each Redfish or
Yellowfish. Yves derives benefits of $50 from each Yellowfish, but only
$10 from each Redfish or Bluefish.
Assume further that the marginal cost imposed on the pool for each
extracted fish is $25, regardless of the type of fish, up to a maximum of
sixty fish per day total. At that point, the marginal cost skyrockets to $60
per fish because the pool begins to become dangerously depleted. Each
of the three fishers internalizes one-third of the cost that each extraction
imposes on the pool, as shown in Table 2.
It is clearly in the interests of the group to prohibit the extraction of
more than sixty fish per day because the costs of doing so outweigh the
benefits in all cases. Below the sixty-fish-per-day limit, it is inefficient for
any fisher to extract any fish other than their "special" fish-the one that
derives the $50-per-fish benefit. Even though extracting the other fish
TABLE 2
EXTRACTION COSTS
Cost to Pool Individual Cost
Per Fish, up to 60 per
Day $25 $8.33
Per Fish in Excess of
60 per Day $60 $20
will yield a net personal benefit to the individual fishers (a benefit of $10,
compared with the internalized cost of $8.33), it will impose a net social
cost (a benefit of $10, compared with a cost to the entire pool of $25).
Therefore, the efficient and fair solution is for Ronald to extract twenty
Redfish, Beth to extract twenty Bluefish, and Yves to extract twenty Yel-
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lowfish. 9 The total benefits enjoyed by the group in this scenario will be
$3000 ($50 x 60), and after subtracting out the costs imposed on the pool
($25 x 60), a net surplus of $1500 per day will be enjoyed by the group.
The participants could set a simple twenty-fish daily catch limit to
achieve this result. If permitted only twenty fish, each fisher will harvest
only the type of fish that the fisher finds most profitable.
If, however, a prevailing legal rule requires that separate catch lim-
its be set for each type of fish, and further requires that these limits be
uniformly applied to all fisherfolk, then it suddenly becomes impossible
to reach the efficient result through the legal rules. If forced to set a uni-
form limit for Redfish that will apply to Beth and Yves, as well as to
Ronald, a uniform limit for Bluefish that will apply to Ronald and Yves,
as well as to Beth, and a uniform limit for Yellowfish that will apply to
Ronald and Beth, as well as to Yves, then the group will choose a catch
limit of zero for all three fish. Even if a daily catch limit of one fish of
each type is imposed on the group's members, the costs associated with
extraction would still exceed the benefits derived from fishing.98
Of course, we know that in the real world, Ronald, Beth, and Yves
would be very likely to reach an agreement about fishing from the com-
mon pool that would produce the efficient result.99 In the event that they
could not do so, one would hope that regulatory bodies monitoring the
world of fishing would perceive the problem and either raise the catch
limits and make the catch permits tradable, or switch to a regime in
which the catch limit is set for all fish and not by fish type. Sophisticated
onlookers would surely not dismiss the specter of an idle fishing pool
simply because the parties had joined the pool consensually.
Yet something much like this may be happening in private devel-
opments. If the common pool resource that community members want
to be careful not to overdraw is something rather general and amor-
phous-such as premium ambience-but the specific "draws" made
against that common resource take a multitude of different forms, then
the shape of the problem becomes clear. Instead of three people who re-
ceive differential profits from three different kinds of fish, a private de-
velopment may feature one-hundred people who receive differential pay-
97. There are many efficient solutions. As long as the total is kept below sixty fish per day and
each fisher extracts only his or her "special" fish, it does not matter, from an efficiency perspective,
how many fish each fisher gets to extract. Presumably, however, the fishers will choose the efficient
solution that is also distributionally fair.
98. If each fisher is permitted to take one Redfish, one Bluefish, and one Yellowfish, then each
fisher will enjoy benefits of $70 ($50 + $10 + $10), but will impose extraction costs of $75 on the pool
($25 x 3).
99. The ability of members of a multiparty group to form shifting coalitions regarding the divi-
sion of the surplus associated with a proposed realignment of property rights represents a separate
problem. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alternative Land
Use Controls, 27 J. CoRP. L. 519, 530-31 (2002) (presenting an example in which five individuals with
differing preferences about servitudes may be unable to unanimously agree on a move that would
leave all of them better off). This is an example of the vote-cycling problem identified by Condorcet
and Arrow, see id. at 533-34 & n.47; it is, of course, not limited to the covenant context.
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offs from different kinds of draws against neighborhood ambience. One
individual might greatly enjoy tinkering with a car in the driveway, an-
other individual might greatly enjoy riding a motorcycle, a third individ-
ual might derive great pleasure from keeping four dogs, while a fourth
individual might receive tremendous utility from displaying concrete
gnomes in her front yard. It might be efficient for each of these indi-
viduals to take their preferred "draws" against the neighborhood atmos-
phere; yet if everyone were allowed to do all of these things at once, then
neighborhood atmosphere might rapidly deteriorate, as people under-
took draws that were costly on balance. Forced to choose a single rule
for each specific use that will apply community-wide, developers and
homeowners associations might be expected to select rules that are inef-
ficiently restrictive for some individuals with regard to some uses."
Significantly, neighborhood residents are largely unable to make the
adjustments that we readily assumed our fishing group would make. As
already discussed, differential enforcement is a risky choice for home-
owners associations 01 Nor can residents simply violate the covenants
and pay for the damage. Land use covenants are typically enforced
through injunctive relief (in contract terms, specific performance),1"2 or
through escalating fines.103 One can attempt to get the rule changed
through the governance process, but the changed rule would typically be
an all-or-nothing proposition as well. t"
100. This assumes that developers and homeowners associations are making calculations based on
overall efficiency in designing covenant content and setting rules for community life. It is possible that
a homeowners association might instead respond to pressure from some powerful faction of the
homeowners to remove uniform rules that are efficient (in the limited sense just discussed). In other
words, perhaps the Redfish faction takes over a pool that is made up of a mix of all three types of fish-
erfolk and gets the Redfish limit raised to twenty (while retaining the ban on Yellowfish and Bluefish).
The result will be efficient extraction of Redfish by the fisherfolk who have Ronald's preference pro-
file, but inefficient extraction of Redfish by the people with preferences aligning with those of Beth
and Yves. This is no less troubling than the unduly restrictive example given in the text.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
102. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 52, at 287 n.69 (collecting cites on the availability of injunctive
relief for the violation of negative covenants); Elberg, supra note 52, at 1970-73 (discussing history and
use of specific enforcement for land use agreements at common law).
103. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 52, at 295 (observing that although fines often begin at "com-
pensatory" levels, they are often graduated to reach much higher levels over time if violations persist);
Elberg, supra note 52, at 1973-76 (discussing the availability of supercompensatory fines under the
UCIOA). Legal fees assessed against noncompliant owners can also significantly increase the total
penalty associated with a violation. For a recent example, see Motoko Rich, Homeowner Boards Blur
Line of Just Who Rules the Roost, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, at Al (reporting that one individual who
violated a community's rule regarding trash can placement was ordered to pay nearly $12,000 in fines
and legal fees).
104. See, e.g., Licker v. Harkleroad, 558 S.E.2d 31, 34-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, No.
S02C0569, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 424 (May 13, 2002) (invalidating an attempted covenant amendment that
would release only some of the lots in a private development from residential use and collecting cases
from other jurisdictions supporting that outcome); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 6.10 (1998) (stating that nonuniform amendments are ineffective without consent of negatively af-
fected parties, except where purchasing parties receive notice of potential for such amendments), cited
and discussed in Licker, 558 S.E.2d at 34-35; Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Changing the Rules: Should
Courts Limit the Power of Common Interest Communities to Alter Unit Owners' Privileges in the Face
of Vested Expectations?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1081, 1082, 1103--04 (1998) (finding that courts
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Epstein mentions the possibility that a private development could
include a rule whereby a party burdened by negative restrictions on use
could "free his own unit from the restrictions in question" upon obtain-
ing a sufficient number of signatures from other unit owners.05 How-
ever, such an arrangement could operate to the detriment of those most
directly affected by the use-the unit owner's near neighbors-if the unit
owner could obtain enough signatures elsewhere in the community.1°6
One might also try to buy a release from the servitude from each of one's
neighbors, but this is likely to be impossible in practice. The possibility
of tradable or marketable covenant-violation permits, which would help
to address this problem by allowing people to take the draws that are ef-
ficient for them, has not penetrated the world of private developments.1"
Even blunter land use tools, such as variances, might be adapted to sup-
ply much-needed flexibility in the private development context.1°8
The voluntary nature of residents' entries into private developments
has obscured the fact that all of the same sorts of inflexibility lamented in
the context of municipal zoning exist in an even more rarified and unal-
leviated form in private developments." Indeed, some of the scholars
who have been most critical of restrictions on private adjustments in the
zoning context have embraced the private development paradigm with-
were more likely to invalidate attempts to make covenant changes that would differentially affect par-
ticular individuals or particular lots, as compared with uniformly applied changes); Reichman, supra
note 65, at 158 & n.54 (observing that "[w]here powers to amend a general scheme are held by a home
association or a developer, spot permits are regularly invalidated," and collecting case citations);
Weiser, supra note 52, at 310 & n.162 (citing cases for the proposition that courts will often overturn
attempts to selectively release lots from covenants, but observing that the results might be otherwise if
the declaration specifically provided for such selective releases).
105. Epstein, supra note 75, at 922.
106. As Epstein notes, "[I]t would be quite unthinkable for the majority to be able to vote to re-
lease all its units from the force of the covenants while continuing to impose those covenants upon
others." Id. at 922. A rule permitting individualized release of a unit upon a majority of signatures
could yield precisely this result, if we imagine a majority faction that all agreed to sign each other's
petitions for release of their own units, but refused to sign similar petitions for the minority faction.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 99, at 531-32 & nn.38-41 (discussing difficulties with cycling coalitions
that might be produced by a rule permitting piecemeal changes, and citing case law restricting ability
of homeowner associations to make changes on a less than uniform basis).
107. This is not to suggest that such tools are uncontroversial, or that they are without difficult
design issues of their own. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geogra-
phy: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 569 (2001) (providing an overview of literature regarding the problem of "hot spots" potentially
generated by marketable permit schemes, and providing a proposed solution). I mean merely to ob-
serve that the theoretical solutions that have been explored in other settings have not yet been con-
templated in this context to determine whether or not they-or some suitably modified variation on
them-might, on balance, improve matters.
108. See DUKEMINTER & KRIER, supra note 35, at 984-85 (presenting variances and special excep-
tions as among the methods for adding flexibility to zoning). The use of variances or similar devices is,
in fact, not unknown in private developments.
109. See supra note 88 (demonstrating analytic focus on consensual entry).
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out noting this difficulty." ° Zoning, like environmental law, has received
innovative attention from legal scholars concerned with removing im-
pediments to gains from trade. What is needed, then, is the same appli-
cation of imagination and theory to the problems of life in private devel-
opments. " '
B. Heterogeneity and Exit
An obvious response to the previous argument is to invoke the
availability of "exit," which includes decisions not to enter a particular
private development, as well as decisions to leave. 2 If there is an abun-
dance of different communities catering to different preferences, then we
might expect people to sort themselves out in ways that would obviate
the inefficiencies that could otherwise be created by uniform rules. To
put this in terms of the example given above, people who highly value
Redfish would cluster into one pool, while people who highly value Blue-
fish and Yellowfish would cluster into their respective pools. In the Red-
fish-lovers pool, setting the Redfish catch limit at twenty and the Yellow-
fish and Bluefish catch limit at zero imposes no inefficiencies on the
group, all of whom enjoy the payoff schedule attributed to Ronald
above. Similarly, people who enjoy fixing cars could enter one commu-
nity, while people who enjoy displaying and viewing concrete gnomes
could enter a different community.
The Tiebout hypothesis suggests that people choosing local gov-
ernments look for the same sort of preference match,"3 but few scholars
would contend that the resulting zoning regimes are always optimal."4
Proponents of private developments, however, might point out that it is
more likely that a small private development, formed ab initio and em-
powered to more closely regulate land use and community life, will be
better able to maintain various sorts of homogeneity that will permit vin-
110. See, e.g., FOLDVARY, supra note 62, at 96 (observing that "[z]oning is difficult to change for a
landowner yet subject to change at any time by the city," while ignoring parallel problems in covenant
schemes and suggesting that covenant-bound neighborhoods suffer only from enforcement difficul-
ties); Ellickson, supra note 13, at 687, 691, 713 (discussing disadvantages associated with "centralized
mechanisms" of land use control that restrain an individual "from undertaking a prohibited activity,
even if he is willing to pay for its external costs" and criticizing zoning on these grounds, but suggesting
that developer-crafted covenants will be efficient).
111. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 13, at 703 (discussing "imaginative leap" in zoning associated
with sale of development rights in New York City); NELSON, supra note 81, Introduction to Part V, at
4 (suggesting that there has been a lack of imagination and experimentation thus far in private devel-
opments).
112. See FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 73 (explaining that economists use the term "exit" to encom-
pass not only decisions to leave a jurisdiction, but also "the unwillingness of outsiders to enter a juris-
diction because of the unappealing conditions there").
113. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422
(1956) (analogizing consumers' choices among communities to "the private market's shopping trip").
114. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 8, at 843-52 (discussing critiques of zoning).
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dication of specific preferences."15 Furthermore, the problem of universal
rules is not nearly as serious in the private development setting as it
might be in the zoning context, some would argue, because in the former
situation one is intentionally and voluntarily choosing a community that
matches one's individual preferences."1 6 Finally, a private entity may be
more responsive to exit-that is, more sensitive to market demand-than
a public entity such as a municipality, given the clear mandate of the
profit motive in the former case and the lack of such clear motive in the
latter case.117
Despite these considerations, it remains implausible that there will
be a sufficient number and variety of private developments in a given
metropolitan area to enable each resident to find one that aligns per-
fectly with that resident's own preferences. Yet, even if all imaginable
bundles of covenants cannot realistically be provided in a particular met-
ropolitan area, it might seem sufficient that each person can select the
bundle most well-suited to that person's own tastes-understanding that
some degree of divergence from personal preferences will be inevita-
ble. 18 Private developments typically feature a multitude of different
rules that are designed to foster a particular neighborhood environment
and to preserve property values. People within those communities may
be heterogeneous with regard to the benefits they would derive from vio-
lating each of those many rules. It is possible that the surplus a given in-
dividual receives from the enforcement of certain rules outweighs the
losses other rules generate for that individual, so that the overall bundle
remains a good bargain. However, the fact that the bundle represents a
better deal than the other available bundles does not mean that the re-
sults cannot be improved upon. There is no reason to ignore the remain-
ing sources of inefficiency, and the prospect for additional gains that
might be associated with addressing them.
Whether addressing those inefficiencies would cost more than it is
worth is a separate question. In answering that separate question, it is
important to clearly define the goal of the land use controls in question.
If a large part of the goal is to assemble groups of people who have simi-
lar tastes in matters such as yard art-perhaps to fulfill some of the social
or associational gains mentioned above-then perhaps we can do no bet-
ter than hope for a proliferation of different communities into which
people might sort themselves. If the goal is instead to produce the local
115. See FOLDVARY, supra note 62, at 71 (observing that "communities can be created anew and
fashioned to suit the preferences of a group").
116. See sources cited supra note 88 (discussing the role of voluntary choice in private communi-
ties).
117. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHi. L. REV. 345, 356 (2000) (arguing that there is no reason to assume
"that government, as a collective entity, will rationally pursue any particular goal, let alone rationally
maximize wealth or any other single variable").
118. See FOLDVARY, supra note 62, at 71 (noting that communities can provide close matches on
key attributes even if they cannot offer "impossibly perfect matches").
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public good of premium neighborhood ambience, then there may well be
people who agree in principle on what such ambience would look and
feel like, but for whom the lowest-cost way of making their own contribu-
tion to the ambience would vary.
This point can be clearly illustrated by drawing an analogy to pollu-
tion. There are many pollutants and many means through which pollu-
tion can be generated and controlled, all of which bear on the overall air
quality of a particular area. Imagine that, in response to industrialists'
concerns that the air quality in industrial areas was becoming unhealthy
for workers, a new group of developers began setting up private indus-
trial parks in which ambient pollution was to be controlled through pri-
vate covenants. Industrialists could choose which industrial park to en-
ter, but would have to abide by that industrial park's rules, unless a
release could be purchased from every other factory in the community.
If the only tool that these private developments had for controlling pollu-
tion was a set of "command-and-control" limits equally applicable to all
factories (e.g., uniform rules requiring installation of particular scrubbers
and filters, uniform maximum limits on each effluvium), then the poten-
tial for inefficiency would be clear to everyone, notwithstanding the fact
that, in this hypothetical, the factory owners got to choose which indus-
trial community to join. For reasons that have been explored elsewhere,
enabling each factory to choose the forms of pollution abatement that
are cheapest for it would likely be a better solution,"9 especially if we
knew that the large number of factories involved made it a virtual impos-
sibility for any factory to negotiate release from particular covenants
with all of the other factories.
In the pollution example, nothing of value is gained by assembling
together groups of factories for whom the same means-say, attachment
of a particular filter-is the cheapest way of contributing to premium air
quality. This is a bit less clear in the private development context, in part
because what constitutes premium neighborhood ambience is open to
question in a way that air quality is not. Those for whom refraining from
yard art is the cheapest way to contribute to neighborhood ambience
may well suffer more agony from the presence of yard art than would
another person for whom refraining from yard art is more costly. A sec-
ond difference is that homeowners in private developments might seek
associational gains that can only be achieved by assembling together peo-
ple with common aesthetic preferences. It remains an open empirical
question whether private developments fit better with the model of gen-
eral pollution control (controlling tackiness of all sorts to generate a pre-
mium ambience) or whether significant gains are achieved by assembling
119. See Ellickson, supra note 13, at 688-89 ("Prevention costs will tend to be higher when either
or both of the parties are compelled to undertake specific steps than when they are permitted to select
voluntarily among available preventative measures.").
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together people based on specific means of achieving a particular
neighborhood environment.
C. Preference Misalignments over Time
Even if we assume, counterfactually, that every homebuyer is able
to find and enter a private development that, at the moment of closing,
has in place servitudes that perfectly fit with that homebuyer's prefer-
ences in every respect, preference misalignments continue to loom. We
live in a dynamic world where people's preferences change and where
the membership in any given community is fluid. Thus, as time passes,
the homebuyer's preferences may begin to diverge from those expressed
in the set of servitudes imposed by the community.2 ° There are two ba-
sic ways this can happen. First, the homebuyer's preferences might
change. Second, the community's use restrictions might change. While
both possibilities have been mentioned in the literature, the idea that
they are two sides of the same coin and that they together point to a ba-
sic structural problem in private servitude regimes has not been fully ex-
plored.
This is somewhat surprising, for these are precisely the same risks
that have long been recognized in the municipal land use setting, where
there are mechanisms in place that attempt, however imperfectly, to
manage those risks. In the public sphere, we have the Takings Clause"2'
and the nonconforming use doctrine121 to protect against the risks pre-
sented by rule changes regarding the use of land. In addition, zoning law
provides some mechanisms, such as the variance and the special excep-
tion, for allowing the homeowner to petition for individual, parcel-by-
parcel changes. The results are admittedly imperfect. Many would say
that the Takings Clause and the nonconforming use doctrine do too little
to protect landowners from majoritarian rule changes,2 3 and some have
argued that nothing short of open market sale of zoning rights would al-
120. If people were blessed with perfect foresight and could perfectly predict their own future
preferences, the future preferences of potential purchasers of their homes, and the future course of the
community's use restrictions, then all of these factors could be taken into account at the outset and
these later changes would not pose a problem. Of course, such is not the case. See Stewart E. Sterk,
Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 967-71 (1988) (discussing the inade-
quacy of foresight in the servitude context).
121. The Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution states: "[Nior shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Most state constitutions have par-
allel clauses; moreover, the federal Takings Clause is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, and thereby made applicable to the states. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 35,
at 1093 n.2. While the Takings Clause does place some limits on regulatory encroachments into land
use, those limits are quite unclear. See id. at 1232-38 (summarizing a variety of academic views on
regulatory takings jurisprudence).
122. See JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 721 (8th ed. 2002) (dis-
cussing law permitting continuation of preexisting nonconforming uses, subject to various limitations).
123. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Property
Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77 (2002) (discussing the property rights movement's
critique of existing protections).
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low optimal readjustments of individual land use rights.124 Yet, as ma-
ligned and imperfect as the municipal analogs for dealing with the prob-
lems of land use are, they represent finer-grained solutions to problems
of community life than many private developments provide through
covenant-based controls.
Of course, the governance structure of the homeowners association
tries, in a rough fashion, to balance these risks of community life by set-
ting up certain procedures for changing the rules. For example, a super-
majority vote might be required for certain changes. However, because
the rules that govern private development life generally are changed, or
not changed, on an all-or-nothing basis, there is little opportunity to
make adjustments for individual landowners. Moreover, the require-
ment of a supermajority only reduces, but does not eliminate, the majori-
tarian risks associated with rule change."2
These problems represent inefficiencies, and they do not go away
just because people voluntarily signed themselves into the regime and
could choose to go elsewhere -any more so than municipal inefficiencies
associated with zoning go away because people voluntarily chose to live
in a particular place and could choose to move away.
The possibility that preference or membership changes among the
necessary majority or supermajority will lead to rule changes that disad-
vantage a minority interest within a community has received a good bit
of attention. 26 This problem is analogous to that of regulatory takings in
the municipal land use setting.'27 For example, a person who moves into
a community that has no rules against motorcycles might be disadvan-
taged by a later rule change by the majority that takes away her right to
ride a motorcycle in the community. Alternatively, a person who moves
into a community that presently bans motorcycles might be disadvan-
taged if motorcycle riders became powerful enough politically to push
through a lift on the ban. There have been suggestions that the govern-
ing documents (the "constitution") of the private development should
124. See Marion Clawson, Why Not Sell Zoning and Rezoning? (Legally, That Is), CRY CAL.,
Winter 1996-67, at 9, 9 (asking "[wihy should the zoning of land for intensive development, or rezon-
ing to a higher use, not be openly sold in competitive bidding?"); Fischel, supra note 91, at 321-29
(presenting a proposal for salable zoning); Nelson, supra note 8, at 848-49 (discussing proposals for
open sale of zoning).
125. See supra note 82 (discussing tradeoffs involved in permitting changes on less than unani-
mous consent); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 99, at 535-36 (suggesting that the unanimity require-
ment traditionally associated with servitude changes can lock homeowners into suboptimal situations,
while a governance regime that permits changes through a majority or other voting rule risks "highly
unstable, chaotic outcomes"); cf. Eagle, supra note 12, at 188 (observing that "[b]argains achieving
only supermajority consent may make unwilling participants worse off"). The fact that a previous,
unanimously adopted bargain included a supermajority procedure might be viewed as extending con-
sent to the outcomes of that process, see supra note 47 (discussing this view), but it does not alter the
fact that changes adopted over the objections of individual homeowners may make them worse off in
ways that they did not contemplate, see Frug, supra note 88, at 1591 (observing that changes made af-
ter residents are already present in a homeowners association introduce the risk of coercion).
126. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1533-34; Sterk, supra note 47, at 273-74.
127. See Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1535.
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include a takings clause, granting compensation to those who are harmed
by a rule change."2
Robert Ellickson discussed this possibility in some detail twenty
years ago.129 His analysis discusses possible ways of getting the takings
clause into the private development constitution, including the possibility
that it could be implied as a matter of law, rather than expressly added."3
He also suggests that the appropriate "just compensation" measure
would take into account not only market value, as the "real" Takings
Clause does, "but also an amount equal to what a 'reasonable person' in
the claimant's particular life situation would lose in irreplaceable sur-
plus."13' Compensation may not be as valuable to the person disadvan-
taged by the rule change as relief from the rule would be, but arguably it
would force majorities to consider the costs imposed on others as a result
of their actions. The idea of addressing majoritarian risks through a "bill
of rights" for private development residents has also been discussed
more recently by Susan French.132
When rule changes generate losers requiring compensation, they
also generate winners. Therefore, the "givings" side of the problem also
must be confronted.133 It would make sense to formulate some mecha-
nism for requiring majorities who stand to benefit from a particular rule
change or adjustment to pay those in the minority who are harmed by
the change. More than this rule of "majorities compensate minorities" is
necessary to confront the first problem identified above-that of individ-
ual changes in preferences, where the individual in question is unable to
muster a majority, or supermajority, for a global rule change. What is
necessary, then, is not only a principle of compensation to losers in the
political process who suffer from rule changes, but also a mechanism for
those who have experienced preference changes to initiate realignments
of land use requirements by offering compensation to others in the group
who are disadvantaged by that realignment. At present, no such mecha-
nism appears to be in general use. To be sure, the doctrine of changed
128. Id. at 1535-39.
129. See id. (discussing potential of private takings clauses to reconcile "majoritarian flexibility
and minority rights").
130. Id. at 1536.
131. Id. at 1538. The example Ellickson gives involves the impact of an amendment that prospec-
tively bans children on a currently childless but still-fertile couple. See id. at 1538-39 (noting that the
claimant would still be expected to mitigate damages, by moving if necessary). The Fair Housing Act
now prohibits private discrimination in housing on the basis of family status (that is, the presence of
minor children), subject to an exception for communities made up primarily of older residents. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604,3607(b) (2003).
132. See generally Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government Should
Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (1992) (discussing the need for such a bill of
rights, and sketching out some possible provisions).
133. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 550 (2001) (observ-
ing that "[flor every type of taking, there exists a corresponding type of giving"); cf. RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 4 (1993) (explaining that "the same set of problems" that are
implicated in governmental "takings" also "arises with respect to the other side of the transaction-
where government gives things to certain individuals").
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conditions may be used to set aside, or limit remedies for the violation of,
covenants based on changes in the community."3  Yet preference
changes in individuals can occur even in the absence of changes in the
community.'35
If enough people are concerned about the possibility of preference
and rule changes, then we would expect the market to respond by offer-
ing communities that are relatively free of restrictions and that strictly
control the ability of the homeowners association to impose additional
restrictions.'36 After all, developers have no personal desire to impose a
particular aesthetic standard or level of regimentation on unwilling sub-
jects; they are merely concerned with maximizing profits.'37 If the market
is not responding by providing less restrictive options, then why does this
134. See Reichman, supra note 65, at 156-58 (discussing and critiquing judicial discretion to deny
specific performance or, in extreme cases, to extinguish the land use obligation where circumstances
have changed and the servitude has become obsolete); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of
Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 652-54 (1985) (discuss-
ing the changed conditions doctrine).
135. For example, a childless couple might have a child, leading them to desire to use their prop-
erty in somewhat different ways. A person might take up a hobby, or get married, or decide to share
their living space with friends or family. Judicial reluctance to release individual parcels based on a
doctrine of changed conditions also limits the amount of flexibility that this doctrine can provide. See
Reichman, supra note 65, at 158 (linking judicial reluctance to release individual parcels based on
changed conditions to limits on homeowner association powers to engage in "spot" permitting, asking
"[i]f private organizations have to adhere to equality of treatment, how can the courts ignore the very
principle which they enforce?").
136. Of course, the lack of rules generates inefficiencies also, which is presumably the reason
covenants were used in the first place. If the inefficiencies associated with the lack of rules are larger
than those arising from uniformly restrictive rules, then we still might see the uniformly restrictive
rules. In other words, the fact that uniformly restrictive rules are selected over no rules does not es-
tablish their superiority over other alternatives, such as liability rules, flexible standards, or tradable
permits.
137. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 115 (2d ed. 1997) (ob-
serving that developers attaching private covenants to the property "presumably believed that the re-
strictions would increase the net value of the projects to their buyers, thereby increasing the total net
amount they themselves could extract"); Ellickson. supra note 13, at 713 (arguing that developers will
be motivated to offer optimal covenants because the developer's "land values will rise only if his home
buyers perceive that the covenants will reduce the future nuisance costs they might suffer by an
amount greater than the sum of their loss of flexibility in use and future administrative costs"); Ep-
stein, supra note 75, at 917 (observing that a developer "has all the right incentives to offer the ideal
mix of burdens and benefits. If he offers inferior terms, then his return from sales will suffer because
the price that he can command in the market for the units will be reduced.").
The foregoing assumes that consumers are the only audience that developers must try to please in
designing covenant regimes. Because developers must also gain the approval of lenders and local
governments to do their projects, these players may also shape the resulting regime and governing
documents in various ways. See Marc A. Weiss & John W. Watts, Community Builders and
Community Associations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in Private Residential Governance, in
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SYSTEM?, supra note 89, at 95, 99-100 (discussing FHA policies during the period from 1935 to 1963,
which "strongly promoted the use of comprehensive deed restrictions and insisted that they be
vigorously enforced"); id. at 101-02 (explaining that "[dlevelopers creating associations increasingly
are responding to local governments' subdivision regulations rather than to the home buyers'
interests," diluting the "market-driven rationale"). To the extent these additional players are
imperfect agents of consumers, further disconnects between consumer preferences and market
offerings might be introduced. I thank Michael B. Kelly for prompting me to consider this line of
inquiry.
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fact not provide convincing proof that people living in private develop-
ments really do want the restrictions they are getting? Indeed, one might
begin to suspect that the only people who are unhappy with the resulting
arrangements are intermeddling academics like myself. While such a
possibility is well worth entertaining, there are reasons to suspect that the
market is less capable of reliably delivering on consumer preferences for
servitudes than often has been assumed. In the following parts,138 I ex-
plore some reasons why.
III. MARKET IMPERFECTIONS RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT DYNAMICS
Imperfections in the market for servitudes create additional risks
that servitudes in private communities may fail to align with the prefer-
ences of the individuals living within them. In this part, I consider two
sources of such risk: the intercommunity dynamics that result from a
multitude of private developments in the same metropolitan area,139 and
the path-dependent dynamics of CC&R formulation. 4 °
A. Intercommunity Interactions
A developer does not make decisions about the servitudes for a
given community in a vacuum. Rather, the fact that the developer's
community will draw from the same pool of potential customers as other
communities within the same metropolitan area makes developer deci-
sions subject to interdependencies. The interdependence of developer
decision making about servitudes may not play a major role where many
nonservitude neighborhoods exist, but as the overall market share of pri-
vate developments increases, we would expect these interdependencies
to become more pronounced.
The interdependence of decision making among municipalities
within a given metropolitan community has long been recognized. In
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,141 for
example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that a sort of stra-
tegic game may play out among local governments in municipal areas re-
garding undesirable or costly uses, such as low-income housing units.'42
Because provision for such uses within the greater metropolitan region
138. See infra Parts III-IV.
139. See infra Part III.A.
140. See infra Part III.B.
141. 336 A.2d 713, 723 (N.J. 1975). This case was the first of a trilogy regarding municipal obliga-
tions with respect to low-income housing. See also S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel II); Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards,
510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) (referred to as "Mount Laurel III").
142. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 723 (explaining that "[a]lmost every one [of the developing mu-
nicipalities in the region] acts solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect builds a wall
around itself to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to the tax base, despite the loca-
tion of the municipality or the demand for varied kinds of housing").
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benefits all municipalities (by, for example, giving low-wage workers a
place to live), but the costs fall only on the municipality that accommo-
dates the uses, the problem takes the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma. As
Clayton Gillette explains, if municipalities are allowed to exclude disfa-
vored uses, and most do so, then a situation is created in which "munici-
palities that might accept a 'fair share' of such homes would fear that
they will end up accepting all of them if other localities proscribe such
uses."
143
In the municipal context, this dynamic is usually explained by refer-
ence to the impact of the disfavored uses on the tax base.1" For example,
a high-density, low-income housing complex will contain many people
who will need to use municipal services, but each resident will be con-
tributing relatively little to the tax base because of the low value of the
properties they are occupying. 145 There is much more to municipal zon-
ing than this sort of "fiscal zoning," however.'" Often, certain uses are
excluded because of a desire not to live near that use, which, in turn, of-
ten boils down to a desire not to have certain types of people as
neighbors.'47 This is just as true-indeed, arguably more true-in private
developments as it is in municipalities. If enough private developments
are able to keep out enough uses, then the choices of the excluded be-
come constrained, raising obvious questions of social justice.'" Less ob-
vious, but directly relevant here, choices may also end up being simulta-
neously constrained for the included-that is, for those who end up living
within private developments. Thus, even if most individuals in most
communities would prefer a more lenient servitude regime, no develop-
ment wants to be the only lenient one in a field of stringent communities.
The problem is one of adverse selection,'49 as the following illustrations
will show.
143. Gillette, supra note 10, at 1437.
144. See, e.g., Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 723 ("There cannot be the slightest doubt that the reason
for this course of conduct has been to keep down local taxes on property... and that the policy was
carried out without regard for non-fiscal considerations with respect to people, either within or without
its boundaries.").
145. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12
URB. STUD. 205 (1975).
146. See Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Local Zoning Ordinances to Regulate Population Flows
and the Quality of Local Services, in ESSAYS IN LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS 201, 201-19 (Orley C.
Ashenfelter & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1977) (discussing possibility that zoning might be motivated not
only by fiscal considerations but also by concerns about the effects of population characteristics on
public goods).
147. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 642-45 (2002) (reviewing WIL-
LIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENT TAXATION. SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)) (discussing role of prefer-
ences about people in municipal land use decisions).
148. Gillette, supra note 10, at 1438 ("As the number of communities who endorse the same ex-
clusion multiplies, however, the mobility of the excluded may become so constrained as to trump the
interests in upholding the exclusion.").
149. See Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q. J. ECON.
745, 752 & n.12 (1990) (observing that if self-selection with regard to a jointly held asset is permitted,
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First, consider homeowner dues collection. Imagine a starting point
in which all communities have harsh collections procedures and use the
full power of the law, including foreclosure mechanisms, to effectuate
those collections. 50 Many people dislike the harsh dues enforcement re-
gime, but they effectively have no choice because all communities have
the same procedures. Recognizing this unmet consumer demand, one
community, Heart Hollow, decides to become more forgiving; it will
work with people if they fall behind on their dues, and legally binds itself
to never foreclose or take any other harsh enforcement action. The
community uses this as a selling point, stressing that it is a "real commu-
nity" with a "big heart." It is easy to see what will happen. People who
are most likely to fall behind on their payments, the Slackers, will self-
select into Heart Hollow. Solvent people who will not need this leniency,
the Sticklers, will go elsewhere to avoid having to cross-subsidize the
Slackers. Soon Heart Hollow will no longer be able to maintain its
common areas because it is filled with Slackers and nobody is paying on
time. This does not mean that Heart Hollow's developer misread con-
sumer demand-it might well be the case that everyone would prefer a
world in which lenient procedures, rather. than harsh procedures, were
used. Unless this is imposed globally, however, an adverse selection
problem will occur.
A similar dynamic could apply to other sorts of restrictive cove-
nants, such as strict limits on pets, lawn ornaments, exterior paint colors,
and motorcycles. While it might be the case that many people would not
mind an occasional house with, for example, four pets, or a motorcycle,
or a gnome in the front yard, obvious difficulties arise if one's community
is the only one in the metropolitan area that allows a particular use. The
concern would be that permitting a particular use would attract an un-
welcome concentration of the particular phenomenon, rather than just
the expected, and perhaps unobjectionable, "fair share" that one might
get from a random cross-section of the population. For example, a de-
velopment might wish to permit homeowners free expression in paint
color, but if all of the other developments in the area restrict paint colors
to very boring palettes, the development might fear that only people who
have no sense of decorum will flock to its free-painting zones. Even
people who have a mild preference for a house with purple trim may fear
that the neighborhood will go to seed once it is filled with paint anar-
chists and that home values will drop.
Relatedly, some people might be concerned about living near a con-
centrated number of the "type of people" who really, really care about
being able to paint their houses the color of their choosing. They might
some of the self-selectors will be "adverse selectors -individuals who value the asset highly because
they can gain at others' expense").
150. See NATELSON, supra note 50, § 5.3, at 173-74 (discussing remedies available to property
owners' associations, including foreclosure).
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imagine that people who have strong preferences about paint color are
insufficiently serious-minded or unduly frivolous. To the extent that
covenants constitute signals about community member characteristics,15
developers and residents will take pains to control the content of the sig-
nals that they send. In a world where most communities strictly regulate
external aesthetic elements, permissiveness about one or more of those
elements sends a stronger signal than it would in a world where permis-
siveness of that sort is widespread. If those for whom the signal has the
greatest attraction are believed to possess undesirable personal charac-
teristics, then the signal will repel those who do not want to live near
large concentrations of likely signal-responders -including those who
have no objection to, or even a mild preference for, the underlying use. 52
B. Path Dependence
The foregoing account explains why there might be a reluctance for
any one community to deviate from the restrictive norms that dominate
in a given metropolitan area, but it does not explain how those restrictive
norms were established in the first place. One explanation would go
something like this: the first people to form private developments were
those who were the least tolerant of various sorts of deviations from cer-
tain conservative standards. 53 As they left the "ordinary" neighbor-
hoods and entered into private developments with severe restrictions,
this altered the mix in the ordinary neighborhoods, making them less
conservative, on the whole, than they were before the exodus. This
likely spurred additional departures from the next least tolerant strata of
homebuyers, 54 who would again be expected to impose rather strict ser-
vitudes to keep the less conservative elements from following them. As
more and more private developments were added to the mix, the per-
ceived risk of drawing a self-selected concentration of a particular unde-
sirable use increased. This increasing risk kept the servitudes restrictive,
even as the communities began to attract many people who did not nec-
essarily share the ultra-conservative views of those whose preferences
shaped the earlier communities.
151. Gillette, supra note 10, at 1395 (explaining that for those for whom "service packages and
homogeneity are inherently related," covenants can be valuable insofar as they "provide a salient sig-
nal, reducing both the search costs involved in finding like-minded individuals and the risk of regret
that would be suffered should one discover, after making an expensive home purchase, that the
neighborhood is less hospitable than originally assumed").
152. For example, Gillette explains that "even where individuals do not have an aversion to cer-
tain practices that are prohibited in covenants, such as maintenance of trailer homes, they may believe
that there is a correlation between the subject of the covenant and characteristics that can serve as the
basis for a desirable affinity." Id. at 1396.
153. I am using "conservative" here to refer to aesthetic sensibilities, not political positions.
154. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 150-51 (1978) (de-
scribing the "chain reaction" that can result from movement of individuals, given the fact that
"[e]verybody who selects a new environment affects the environment of those he leaves and those he
moves among").
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This is just one possible account of how servitude regimes might
start out strict and stay strict, even when this ends up ultimately not serv-
ing the preferences of the people who live within them. It is similar to
path dependent stories that have been told in other contexts."' A related
explanation would also begin with the premise that the earliest private
developments were formed by those holding the most conservative pref-
erences, but would attribute the later adoption of similarly strict servi-
tudes in later-formed communities to developer inertia. In this account,
the same paperwork was simply recycled and used in new community af-
ter new community, because it was easy to do, had been field-tested
without terrible results, had been formulated to comply with applicable
governmental and lender standards, and did not seem to be encountering
any serious market resistance.'56
Another type of path dependence also bears examination. Devel-
opers typically maintain control of the development during the early
stages of the development's life, only relinquishing control to the home-
owners association when the project is close to completion and most of
the homes have been sold.5 7 To see how this dynamic might affect servi-
tude content, it is necessary to recall that the only homebuyers who could
155. A standard, albeit disputed, example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. See S.J. Lie-
bowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (contending that the
path-dependent account of the keyboard's dominance is not well-supported). Whether or not the
keyboard's persistence is actually an example of path dependence (which turns on the subsidiary claim
that other, better keyboarding systems came along later, but were not adopted because of the en-
trenchment of the QWERTY system), it plainly illustrates the kind of setting in which we might expect
path dependence to be important. See Michael J. Dorf, The Paths to Legal Equality: A Reply to Dean
Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 791, 807 & n.103 (2002). Yet, as the typewriter dispute illustrates, it is not
easy to distinguish dominance facilitated by path dependence from that won through superiority on
the merits-a fact that counsels against jumping too readily to conclusions about the role of path de-
pendence.
156. See, e.g., Hyatt, supra note 14, at 336-37 (presenting "reliance upon forms" as an "impedi-
ment to evolution"); Winokur, supra note 9, at 75-78; David C. Drewes, Note, Putting the "Commu-
nity" Back in Common Interest Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Re-
view, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 314, 329-30 (2001) ("The prevalence of this ethos of restrictiveness has
been amplified by the fact that, to facilitate the booming growth of and respond to the growing de-
mand for CICs, developers and their attorneys have recycled restrictive form documents, originally
crafted according to the principle the more restrictive the better."); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boiler-
plate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-29 (1997) (describing benefits of the use of standard terms in con-
tracts, including network and learning externalities, more efficient drafting, familiarity of terms to oth-
ers, and decreased uncertainty about the terms as a result of judicial precedent); Russell Korobkin,
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form
Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1605-08 (1998) (presenting experimental results supporting inertia as a
behavioral influence, and suggesting that it plays a role in content of form contracts).
157. See, e.g., Barton & Silverman, supra note 1, at 34 (explaining that "[t]he association normally
remains under developer control until 75 percent of the homes are sold" and that "[i]n a system with
one vote for each home, the developer will hold a block of votes until all units are sold"); Donald J.
Boudreaux & Randall G. Holcombe, Contractual Governments in Theory and Practice, in THE VOL-
UNTARY CITY, supra note 3, at 289, 295 (explaining that in Park West, a community in Fairfax County,
Virginia, "the developer retains the right to three votes per lot until either a purchaser or renter occu-
pies the property"); Reichman, supra note 6, at 286 ("The covenants and bylaws of the typical home-
owners' association are aimed at securing absolute control for the developer until a substantial part of
the project is sold.").
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even theoretically have any impact at all on the content of the restric-
tions are the first set of buyers, who are looking at homes before the dec-
laration has been recorded.15 8 These buyers face a lengthy period in
which the developer will maintain dictatorial control and they themselves
will have no say in matters. The developer who inserts stringent cove-
nants will find homebuyers more willing to make early purchases against
that backdrop of powerlessness and uncertainty. In this way, the devel-
oper precommits to a particular development plan.159
Because the earliest residents bear the greatest risk-unlike later
residents, they cannot reassure themselves about a community by scan-
ning the completed neighborhood -they are likely to desire a high level
of protection against uncertainty in the form of restrictive servitudes.
Once the restrictions are in place, everyone else who enters the commu-
nity must agree to abide by them. It is true that if a majority (or super-
majority) of the community later wished to lift some restrictions, they
could do so. However, they would be doing so in a world where all of the
other communities are located at the same starting point-relatively
strict servitudes -making the lifting of restrictions in a single community
risky for the reasons described above."
It is also true that a developer would not bow to early purchasers'
pressures for overly strict covenants if the developer expected that such
covenants would generate enough market resistance among later buyers
to reduce the overall present-value return on the development. Instead,
the developer might lure in the earlier buyers with less costly induce-
ments, such as price concessions.' 6 ' If homebuyers are significantly more
risk averse than developers, however, then it is not clear that price con-
cessions would be a viable alternative. Risk-averse homebuyers would
have to be compensated rather handsomely, in excess of the expected
value of losses, for taking a chance on the neighborhood, while develop-
ers would be unlikely to give up a lump sum of cash that is significantly in
excess of the expected costs associated with later market resistance due
to the covenants. Moreover, the market signals from buyers to develop-
ers are often muted, calling into question whether developers are in a po-
sition to accurately discern and respond to the preferences of all home-
buyers. The following part addresses these points.
158. Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 7, at 653 & nn.253-54 (noting that where the developer
does not record the development's governing documents until just before closing on the first lot, the
first set of purchasers may have a chance to ask about and potentially influence those documents;
however, purchasers in commercial developments take advantage of this opportunity more often than
do residential homebuyers).
159. Such self-binding is at the heart of contractual obligation. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 13 (1981) ("If it is my purpose, my will that
others be able to count on me in the pursuit of their endeavor, it is essential that I be able to deliver
myself into their hands more firmly than where they simply predict my future course.").
160. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
161. I thank Bob Nelson for this point.
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IV. ADDITIONAL OBSTACLES TO PREFERENCE VINDICATION
In this part, I explore a cluster of additional factors that may gener-
ate a gap between homebuyer preferences and the servitude regimes that
prevail in private communities. First, I explore a curious dynamic
through which homeowner risk aversion about resale values may gener-
ate changes in resale values that are independent of the actual prefer-
ences of homebuyers but to which homebuyers must rationally re-
spond.162 This may drive homebuyers to choose blander environments
and more restrictive regimes than they would themselves prefer. Next, I
consider the problem of bundling and its tendency to blunt the market
signals that homebuyers send to developers about servitudes.'63 Third, I
explore the relatively well-recognized problem of homebuyer ignorance
from a slightly different perspective."6  I focus on the ways in which
background expectations about the meaning of property ownership, gov-
ernance, and community may render homebuyers less able to understand
the terms of the arrangement they are entering, and hence less able to
provide the necessary degree of market discipline.
A. Homeowner Risk Aversion
Risk aversion in homeowners, when coupled with certain common-
place assumptions about the resale market, may systematically push
communities in the direction of greater regimentation than most indi-
viduals desire. Homeowners are risk averse for good reason: for most of
them, the home is their single largest asset (human capital aside) and few
of them have much in the way of savings outside of home equity.65 Be-
cause the home represents an undiversified investment that cannot be in-
sured against a drop in value, people seek other means of control over
the financial risk that the home represents. t 6 In the municipal setting,
this often takes the form of political action designed to safeguard home
values. 167 In the private development setting, it may take the form of re-
strictive covenants."6
162. See infra Part IV.A.
163. See infra Part IV.B.
164. See infra Part IV.C.
165. FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 4.
166. Id. at 10-12.
167. Id. at 4-12.
168. Spencer MacCallum describes the way the home investment risk might influence the behav-
ior of a typical couple in a private development:
If they want to make their investment less speculative, their recourse is to try to control some of
those locational, or neighborhood, factors influencing the value and liquidity of their individual
site. In plain words, that means controlling who their neighbors are and how their neighbors live.
The effect of this conflict between resale value and enjoyment of "community" is frequently a
sterile neighborhood.
MacCallum, supra note 9, at 392.
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One might reasonably object that a key purpose of restrictive cove-
nants is to protect property values, 169 and that the fact people use them
for this purpose merely illustrates how well the system is working. Yet
this dynamic can - at least in theory, and quite possibly in practice - lead
to greater restrictiveness than most people would personally prefer. To
see why, it is necessary to recognize the dual nature of the home as both
an item of consumption and a financial investment. A homeowner hopes
to maximize the sum of two things (discounted to present value): the
stream of utility achieved through living in the house and the amount re-
alizable on resale. 170 At times, these two goals are in some tension. Wil-
liam Fischel offers an example of this phenomenon-the fact that people
who remodel their homes must decide to what extent they should at-
tempt to please themselves and to what extent they should attempt to
please the market. 71 While the degree to which each objective will gov-
ern decision making depends on a variety of factors, including discount
rates and the length of time before one plans to move or borrow against
the house, concerns about resale value often figure prominently.
This concern with resale value translates into a general reduction in
aesthetic risk-taking among homeowners. Blandness in architectural de-
signs is the risk averse choice, because it permits one to reach the broad-
est spectrum of the resale market. As Constance Perin explains:
Architecturally innovative housing is said to be unsuccessful among
the majority of housing consumers-but that is because they are
looking ahead to being producers. They are on the lookout for pro-
spective buyers, when that time comes. Those wealthy consumers
who commission "Falling Waters" and "Glass Boxes" as well as
those buying less opulent but still avant-garde housing have other
assets to rely on and are able to wait out the search for a buyer from
their narrower market.72
If daring choices tend to diverge from each other and elicit strong and
conflicting reactions, while bland choices tend to converge on just a few
models that resemble each other closely, then the bland choices would
169. Courts have viewed the protection of property values as an important benefit that can be
secured through restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Dolan-King v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 97 Cal. Rptr.
2d 280, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("Maintaining a consistent and harmonious neighborhood character,
one that is architecturally and artistically pleasing, confers a benefit on the homeowners by maintain-
ing the value of their properties."). On the prominence of property values as a justification for restric-
tions, see, for example, Franzese, supra note 8, at 557 & n.29; Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 7, at
612. See also MCKENZIE, supra note 11, at 19 (observing that in many common interest developments
"[p]reservation of property values is the highest social goal, to which other aspects of community life
are subordinated").
170. See Jan K. Brueckner & Man-Soo Joo, Voting with Capitalization, 21 REGIONAL SCI. & URB.
ECON. 453 (1991) (discussing these two components of home value and modeling their impact on
homeowners' political behavior); Fennell, supra note 147, at 646 & n.121 (discussing this point); see
also Ben-Shahar, supra note 52, at 218 (observing that asset owners are concerned both with the "in-
come flow" associated with the "instantaneous use and enjoyment of the asset" and with the "stock"
or resale value of the asset).
171. FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 150.
172. CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 139 (1977).
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likely capture a plurality of the market, even if many people preferred
more daring choices. To put it another way, the divergence between a
bland choice and any given person's preference is likely to be less than
the divergence between one extreme choice and a different extreme
choice. If so, and if the distribution of preferences is spread evenly along
a spectrum, then picking something that is "middle-of-the-road" will
minimize the divergences between the home and the individual prefer-
ences of homebuyers, and thereby broaden the market for the home.'73
The same concern with resale value that drives personal decisions
about decoration and architecture also influences choices about restric-
tions in a private development. As Korngold observes, "[t]he ugly resi-
dence injures surrounding property values, particularly with relation to
possibilities of re-sale. This represents a damage for which there is no
insurance coverage. "174
It is worth asking why, and in what sense, an "ugly" home in the
neighborhood would cause the value of neighboring homes to drop. To
frame the inquiry, let me specify that I am speaking not of a house that is
in disrepair, or that is smaller or cheaper than the others in the neighbor-
hood, but of a house that is simply ugly in its design or decorating
scheme. The assumption seems to be that the visual agony inflicted by
the ugly home is so great as to diminish the enjoyment neighboring resi-
dents can derive from their consumption of housing. But this is only part
of the answer. The other part of the answer is that the ugly house causes
a drop in property values because the would-be buyers are already wor-
rying that the ugly house will impair their ability to resell. In fact, would-
be buyers might pay less for a home that is next to the ugly house, even if
they themselves found it kind of charming, if they assumed that other
people in their potential resale pool would find it ugly. The same goes
for the merely unusual house, or the one with flamboyant paint colors.
It is presumed that a drop in market value provides irrefutable evi-
dence of ugliness. Frank Michelman asserts that "[tlhe decline in market
value, therefore, ought to be regarded as a kind of socially computerized,
objective evidence that the regulated activity is by a social consensus
deemed intrinsically ugly, negatively suggestive, or destructive of prior
existing beauty."'75 Yet, for people concerned about resale value, fears
of others' reactions can create a self-fulfilling prophecy with respect to
property values. Thus, the fear that others might find something ugly
could impede sales, even if nobody actually found it ugly. The result may
be more blandness than anyone really wants.
173. Cf. Fennell, supra note 147, at 647 (discussing circumstances in which a homeowner would
make political choices designed to please the "median homebuyer").
174. Korngold, supra note 18, at 626.
175. Frank Michelman, Toward a Practical Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, PRAC. LAW., Feb.




The "unique" character of parcels of land has been historically
stressed and underlies the justification for specific performance of con-
tracts for the sale of land. a76 Yet this same uniqueness hints at a difficulty
with the typical choice situation that confronts homebuyers. The choice
a homebuyer makes about the community and its servitude regime is
necessarily bundled with a much larger and more salient choice about a
particular house located on a unique parcel.177 Whether one buys into a
private community or an ordinary neighborhood, it is impossible to pur-
chase a home without also purchasing the environment in which that
home is located. This means that there is no potential for competition
among "environment providers" for the business of any given home-
owner, once that homeowner has decided on a house in a particular loca-
tion.17 8
In ordinary neighborhoods, most of the details of neighborhood
ambience are left to some combination of chance and politics. Hence,
the "environment provider" is a composite of one's neighbors and of the
municipal government. In a private development, the developer pro-
vides the environment in the form of CC&Rs. Perhaps part of what
makes one "fall in love" with a given house is the neighborhood envi-
ronment, which consciously or unconsciously factors into one's assess-
ment of the merits of the house and location. Nevertheless, the servi-
tudes are not decided on separately, nor could they be. Moreover, the
covenants themselves are bundled together and are not negotiated indi-
176. See, e.g., Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 73 S.E. 82 (W. Va. 1911) (explaining that "as no
two pieces of land can be regarded as equivalent in value and character in all respects, equity will al-
ways enforce specific performance of a valid contract for the sale thereof"); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 37-38 (1991) (noting that the irreplaceable nature of land
supports the well-settled rule that "contracts to sell real estate are specifically enforceable"); Thomas
S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83
MIcH. L. REv. 341, 364-65 (1984) (noting that equitable relief is discretionarily available in cases
where damages would not fully compensate the plaintiff, and explaining that "[t]he typical cases in
which this under-compensation is said to arise are in the sale of 'unique goods,' the sale of land (con-
sidered by the law, largely for historical reasons, to be a unique good), and long-term input con-
tracts").
177. Cf. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 108-09 (1987) (noting that
courts have sometimes refused to enforce covenants against subsequent owners where the courts be-
lieve "that subsequent purchasers may not adequately reevaluate the large bundle (say, a home in a
particular location) based on a small feature (a mildly annoying covenant)").
178. A futuristic thought experiment illustrates this point. We might imagine a world in which
residential properties were wrapped in layers of virtual reality technology that provided the residents'
selected environments-complete with sounds, smells, sights, and perhaps even personalized weather.
One resident might choose a dynamic "city" environment that provided the simulated experience of
lively bustle, while another might choose a bucolic farm setting featuring distant cows, green pastures,
and chirping crickets. This would have the effect of unbundling the unique parcel of land and the
house from the selected environment. Real competition among providers of this virtual reality tech-
nology would then be possible, in just the same way that telephone companies can now compete for
the business of a given homeowner. In the real world, the bundling problem cannot be avoided.
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vidually, making it less likely that any homebuyer will pay attention to a
given servitude provision.'79
While the bundling point has been made by scholars in the context
of discussions about whether to limit the enforceability of covenants
against subsequent purchasers,' 8° the same idea illuminates something
important about covenants for our purposes: we--and the developers-
cannot tell whether particular covenants attached to a home in a private
development are adding to, or subtracting from, the consumer surplus
that an individual consumer derives from a home purchase.18' Bundling
is ubiquitous in the marketplace, of course, and is usually not viewed as
inconsistent with consumer autonomy.'82 While it necessarily limits con-
sumer choice, and might thereby reduce the available consumer surplus
in a given transaction,'83 it also adds value in other ways by, for example,
reducing production costs, adding convenience for consumers, or reduc-
ing their search costs. Moreover, it is impossible, in any home purchase
context, whether inside or outside a private development, to make a truly
unbundled choice."8 Even if individual homeowners eschew private de-
velopments altogether, or choose ones with loose rules, they do not
really solve the bundling problem. Each homeowner would still be buy-
ing a house that was "bundled" with a particular, although perhaps quite
uncertain, environment -albeit one resulting from the many individual
choices of neighbors, rather than from the unilateral choice of a devel-
oper.
179. See Alexander, supra note 32, at 894-95 ("In a complex transaction the successor (S) may not
have adequately focused on the servitude term. S might have demanded a higher level of compensa-
tion for the servitude term, had that term been negotiated individually rather than as part of a package
containing many items."); id. at 895 (citing Mark Kelman for the "bundling problem").
180. Id.; see also KELMAN, supra note 177, at 108-09.
181. See Hovenkamp, supra note 99, at 530 (stating that the fact that a homebuyer, B, agrees to
purchase subject to a set of servitudes "does not guarantee that B received the optimal set of servi-
tudes from her perspective," but rather "tells us only that B was willing to pay some mutually accept-
able price"). By looking at the prices paid under different covefiant schemes, however, it might be
possible to infer something about their value. One empirical study of condominiums located in an up-
scale portion of Chicago near the lakefront attempted to assess the value added or subtracted (as
measured by sale price) by various kinds of pet covenants. Roger E. Cannaday, Condominium Cove-
nants: Cats, Yes; Dogs, No, 35 J. URB. ECON. 71 (1994). The author concluded that "cats only" cove-
nants added value compared to a "no pets" covenant, while covenants that also allowed dogs reduced
value. Id. at 80 & tbl.3.
182. Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of "Obsolete" Covenants, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 546, 577 (1991) ("Virtually all goods are sold as an aggregation of physically separa-
ble units that some buyers would prefer to have unbundled."); see also Gillette, supra note 10, at 1407
(arguing that "analysis of the scope of association autonomy is not much advanced by recognizing that
even those who are aware of covenants may prefer only some of them, but are locked into a 'coercive,'
all-or-nothing regime"); Sterk, supra note 47, at 302-03 (noting the ubiquity of bundling in all contrac-
tual settings and suggesting that the bundling critique of homeowners associations is unconvincing).
183. As Mark Kelman explains, "The inability to control the availability of all technically feasible
unbundled packages is undoubtedly an enormous source of impotence and determined choicelessness
in private life." KELMAN, supra note 177, at 108.
184. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1408 (noting that municipality residents "similarly must pur-
chase bundled municipal services").
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Given this, we might think that a developer's bundles of home and
environment would be more likely to maximize value than would the
bundles of home and environment that result from the uncoordinated
choices of many individuals. As discussed above, CC&Rs respond to col-
lective action problems-the tendency of homeowners to undertake per-
sonally beneficial but socially costly actions with respect to the neighbor-
hood environment. 85 While it is true that developers hold geographic
monopolies with respect to their developments, a rational monopolist
will be able to maximize profits by providing customers with a desirable
product."l Thus, the mere fact that developers are offering bundles that
are partly composed of "unique" real estate does not suggest that they
will try to pawn off undesirable servitudes on unwilling subjects.
If the developer thought the homebuyers would not notice the dif-
ference, however, the developer might adopt a suboptimal set of servi-
tudes if doing so would save her money (say, because she could reuse
boilerplate from an earlier development). 187 Home purchasers likely pay
attention to only a few salient attributes in making their purchase deci-
sions, and servitudes may not make the cut.188 Of course, seller exploita-
tion of consumer inattention by skimping on less salient features is not
unique to the monopoly situation, but would also occur in competitive
markets where price is among the salient characteristics. 89
The real problem with bundling in this context is not that it permits
developers to exploit homebuyers or force them to accept servitudes that
the developers know they dislike, but rather that it blunts the market
signals that consumers might otherwise be able to send to developers
about their preferences for particular servitude regimes. Because home-
buyers are not in a position to "vote separately" on the servitude regime
with their dollars, even the most vigilant consumers cannot convey
through a home purchase whether the servitudes were valuable to them
or something that they are only putting up with. In other words, a devel-
oper may be unable to tell whether the servitudes were increasing or de-
creasing the consumer surplus associated with the home purchase.19
185. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
186. Epstein, supra note 75, at 918.
187. See Russell B. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscion-
ability, 70 U. CHi. L. REV. 1203, 1234 (2003) (suggesting that "non-salient attributes [of products] are
subject to inefficiencies driven by the strategic behavior of sellers attempting to increase their profits
at the expense of unknowing buyers").
188. See id at 1227-29 (presenting evidence on decision making that suggests buyers often pay
attention to only a limited number of attributes, and citing a study involving choices among houses
that suggests accuracy in decision making drops as the number of attributes rises); see also infra Part
IV.C (discussing role of consumer ignorance in private developments).
189. See Korobkin, supra note 187, at 1234 (explaining that if consumers pay attention to only the
most salient attributes -including price-in making purchase decisions, "market pressures will force
sellers in competitive markets to offer low-quality non-salient contract terms, whether or not such
terms are efficient").
190. In an ordinary neighborhood where land use is controlled by zoning, people often do have
the opportunity to express preferences for land use measures a la carte, through the political process.
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Thus, bundling may keep developers from being able to gather useful in-
formation about buyer preferences that might enable them to better pro-
vide what homebuyers really want.
One might think, however, that competition between private devel-
opments would alleviate this problem by providing an array of choices to
which consumers might respond. Private developments are usually geo-
graphically smaller than municipalities, and it is probably a bit of a fic-
tion to suppose that each one is really "unique" where, for example, doz-
ens of private developments are positioned at points equidistant from a
city center in a metropolitan area. Of course, given the adverse selection
problem discussed above,"' developers might be reluctant to directly
compete on the dimension of leniency, preferring instead to default to a
fairly restrictive model, if that seems to prevail in the area. The preva-
lence of bundling, when coupled with a relatively restricted servitude
choice set for homebuyers, leads to a phenomenon in which developers
may remain unaware of homebuyer preferences. If this is the case, then
the market may not supply the servitude regimes that are actually de-
sired by homebuyers. Margaret Jane Radin observes that "it is not clear
that the nature of the land market and the residential housing market is
such (or everywhere such) that developers will be forced by competition
to create optimal servitude packages."'" The problem is exacerbated by
high levels of consumer ignorance about the private development ex-
perience, as the next subpart discusses.
C. Homebuyer Ignorance and the Role of Expectations
Much has been written about the fact that most people who buy
into private communities do not fully understand what they are getting
into.193 If home purchases arise from misunderstandings, then they can-
not provide meaningful market signals to developers. Arguments based
on the assertion that homebuyers are entering into purchase agreements
without full knowledge sound rather anemic, however. Surely it is not
necessary that every buyer be well-informed in order for market disci-
pline to operate. Even a small minority of well-informed shoppers can
ensure that prices reflect the factors that consumers find important.'94
So too, theoretically, do homeowners in private developments insofar as they can amend their CC&Rs
through the governance structure. However, the real world participation levels may be insufficient to
teach developers very much about consumer preferences.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
192. Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739,756 (1986).
193. See, e.g., Winokur, supra note 8, at 99 & n.32 (collecting cites indicating that "few prospec-
tive owners intelligently review the restrictions to which they subject themselves upon acceptance of a
deed to land burdened by servitudes"). But see Natelson, supra note 49, at 62-63 (describing a Florida
study in which ninety-two percent of respondent condominium owners said the "regulatory scheme"
contributed to their purchase decision, while acknowledging that this does "not demonstrate that pur-
chasers knew of all matters important to consent").
194. See FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 44 (observing that markets can operate efficiently even if only
a few consumers pay attention to quality differences). But see Winokur, supra note 9, at 31-32 (dis-
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Nonetheless, some minimal conditions must be met in order for this
market discipline to work effectively.
First, the response of the vigilant minority must be perceptible to
the suppliers in question-here, the developers. For reasons discussed
above, signals to developers about covenants may be significantly muted.
Second, the response of the vigilant minority must meaningfully repre-
sent the interests of the acquiescent majority. This, too, may not be the
case. Here, it is initially helpful to think of homebuyers as occupying a
spectrum with regard to the tradeoff between free use of property and
the restriction of property use. Some homebuyers are glad to put up with
many restrictions because they value having their neighbors restrained
more highly than they value their own freedom from constraint. Other
homebuyers prefer fewer restrictions because they value their own free-
dom to use their property more highly than they value restraining the
freedom of their neighbors. Yet consumer input can only play a role be-
fore the CC&Rs have been recorded in the declaration, given that they
are uniform community-wide. Given homeowner risk aversion and the
dynamics of path dependence, those who are most interested in imposing
restrictions are likely to have the most influence during the crucial win-
dow of time when home-buying input might be possible. If the vigilant
minority that is providing signals to developers about what homebuyers
want is skewed toward the "restriction-friendly" end of the spectrum,
then the interests of many people on that spectrum will not be protected
in the marketplace.
In addition, homebuyers often do not fully appreciate the signifi-
cance of the relevant documents, because of expectations that they bring
with them to the home purchase.95 It is plausible that those toward the
"free property use" end of the spectrum come to the home-buying trans-
action with particularly strong background assumptions about the mean-
ing of private property. My argument is not that people purchasing in
private developments are systematically coerced or tricked,'96 but rather
that they often are genuinely surprised-and for reasons that are quite
understandable.
The explosive growth of private developments in recent years
means that many consumers are encountering this new form of owner-
ship for the first time. Often, homes in private developments are the
cussing role of "marginal consumers" in providing market discipline in context of form contracts, and
explaining why this source of market discipline might be absent in the servitudes context).
195. See FOLDVARY, supra note 62, at 99 (noting that "some purchasers of RCA [residential
community association] units do not fully understand the association they are being tied into");
Brower, supra note 22, at 246-47 (observing that, notwithstanding required disclosures, "empirical
evidence indicates that most purchasers neither read nor understand those documents, nor do they
fully comprehend what common ownership entails") (footnote omitted).
196. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 44 ("The caricature of developers as villains dressed in black
and twirling their mustaches while purchasers sign residential association agreements is, of course,
only that-a caricature."); see also FOLDVARY, supra note 62, at 99-100 (arguing that incomplete in-
formation about private communities does not render consumer choices involuntary).
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only affordable choices for young couples making their first home pur-
chases.197 More experienced homebuyers might bring with them to the
purchase a set of background expectations based upon their past home-
owning experiences, which were likely not in a private development. Not
only do the CC&Rs explicitly include terms that may be unfamiliar, they
also accompany a different sort of ownership regime that silently dis-
penses with many core background assumptions to which people are ac-
customed. In particular, the servitude regimes that prevail in private de-
velopments tend to clash with background expectations about the
meaning of property, governance, and community.198
Lay notions about the meaning of property lack technical precision
and are heavily conditioned by culture and experience.199 This is perhaps
nowhere more true than in the case of the detached single-family dwell-
ing, which, for many U.S. homeowners, has come to epitomize the idea
of private property.2" The Blackstonian vision of property as "that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the ex-
ternal things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other in-
dividual in the universe"2 obviously overstates matters, but it is an en-
trenched part of our cultural heritage that continues to cast a long
shadow over lay understandings of property ownership.2" Indeed, it
197. See Callies et al., supra note 1, at 178 (observing that "[i]n many parts of the country, it is
increasingly difficult for prospective homeowners to find housing outside such [private] communi-
ties").
198. Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, list several reasons that problems may be greater in a
private development than in an ordinary neighborhood or small town. Some of these reasons involve
the failure of the experience in a private development to square with expectations or established un-
derstandings, and track some of the points made in this section. See Silverman & Barton, supra note 9,
at 141-42 (observing that "the use of common ownership as a vehicle for meeting public needs violates
people's understandings of ownership," and that "the idea of neighbors policing neighbors is not only
in contradiction to cultural understandings of homeownership, but also it fails to provide the internal
checks and balances that people associate with fairness in the U.S. system of government"); see also
Hyatt, supra note 14, at 314 (discussing the theme of "expectations" in critiques of private develop-
ments).
199. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION passim, 94, 98-99
(1977) (contrasting lay notions of property held by an "Ordinary Observer" with those of a "Scientific
Policymaker," and discussing the impact of social expectations and the socialization process on the
former); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 10 (2000) (discuss-
ing "cultural underpinnings" of conventional presumptions about property entitlements); see also Ber-
nard E. Jacob, The Law of Definite Elements: Land in Exceptional Packages, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369,
1395 (1982) ("Our language constantly suggests that what I own is part of me.... Such a myth, simul-
taneously mighty and childlike, does not wait to unravel complexes of jural relations.").
200. See SINGER, supra note 199, at 29 ("In imagining the meaning of property, people call on a
particular set of core conceptions, images, examples, and pictures of the social world. Property is
about ownership, and the core image of ownership is ownership of a home."). To be sure, many pri-
vate developments are made up of townhouses or condominium units, rather than single-family dwell-
ings. Because the clash with lay understandings of property is likely to reach its apex in the case of a
single-family detached home, I will use that as the prototype for this discussion. The same reasoning
may apply, to some extent, to the ownership of other housing types.
201. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2.
202. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 199, at 3 (quoting Blackstone in connection with his discussion
of the "ownership model" of property); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NoMos
XXII: PROPERTY 69, 73 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (quoting Blackstone and
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serves as a mental starting point against which claims of other individuals
or of society at large may be assessed.0 3 Of course, most people readily
recognize that the enjoyment of their homes is properly conditioned and
circumscribed by social considerations and that reciprocal restraint un-
derlies life in a community. Yet the notion of "ownership" remains vital.
As J.W. Harris explains, "[o]wnership acts as an irreducible organizing
idea in the daily, non-contested functioning of a property institution.
' 204
It seems likely that people have preconceived, culturally condi-
tioned notions about the content of "ownership" and the types of claims
that may properly be made against their private property rights. 25 It is
telling that many critics of private developments provide specific exam-
ples of use restrictions, often offering anecdotes about enforcement ac-
tions.26 This is an effective way of capturing reader interest for the very
reason that the restrictions featured in these anecdotes tread upon our
embedded understanding of what property ownership means. The frus-
tration that results from this sort of line-crossing is evident in the words
of one of the homeowners interviewed by Gregory Alexander: "I find
the rule that you can't build any structure without the [approval] of the
board to be completely unreasonable. The homeowners' association has
got to be kidding; this is my property!"I
Another factor contributing to consumer confusion about the na-
ture of private developments inheres in lingering uncertainty about the
legal status and appropriate conceptualization of the private develop-
ment. Indeed, Wayne Hyatt and Jo Anne Stubblefield have suggested
that communities governed by homeowners associations suffer from an
"identity crisis."'2°" For example, there is an ongoing debate about
whether, and to what extent, the actions of private developments should
constitute "state action" for constitutional purposes.2 While I do not
explaining that "[t]he conception of property held by the legal and political theorists of classical liber-
alism coincided precisely with the present popular idea, the notion of thing-ownership"); Jacob, supra
note 199, at 1391-95 (citing Blackstone in discussion of the influence of the "complete ownership
model" and the tendencies that perpetuate it).
203. See SINGER, supra note 199, at 3-4 (discussing the pervasiveness of the "ownership model"
of property, in which freedom from property regulation is the baseline assumption, and the burden lies
with those who would limit the uses of property).
204. J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JusTicE 65 (1996).
205. SINGER, supra note 199, at 3 (noting that the principle that one's own land use must be
limited to avoid harm to others is often "understood narrowly").
206. See, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 11, at 15-18 (presenting examples of HOA enforcement
actions against seemingly uncontroversial conduct, such as putting up a fence to keep one's young
child from falling off a 400-foot cliff); Franzese, supra note 8, at 555-56 (providing examples of HOA
restrictions, which govern such matters as doghouse construction materials, cooking implements, and
required attire in the common areas); id. at 574 (describing violations that led to litigation); Winokur,
supra note 8. at 107 & n.62 (providing examples of HOA power over "many seemingly minor details
of personal behavior and aesthetic judgments").
207. Alexander, supra note 8, at 160. To be sure, not all homeowners resent private development
rules; another of Alexander's interviewees described the rules as "just perfect." Id.
208. Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 7, at 593.
209. See, e.g., HYATr & FRENCH, supra note 15, ch. 4 (presenting materials on the constitutional
issues surrounding the public/private question); Brower, supra note 22, at 250-55 (discussing various
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wish to join that fight here, it is worth noting that as long as questions
remain about whether and to what extent actions taken within a private
development are constitutionally constrained, critics of private develop-
ments may not feel free to make the kinds of representations about those
communities that might actually aid in consumer comprehension about
the nature of the governance regime they are joining. Those who believe
homeowners associations should be treated as state actors might oppose
boilerplate disclosures indicating that the homeowners association is not
a state actor bound by the Constitution, for example. Consumers, there-
fore, do not receive a clear and blunt message to the effect that buying
into a private development means leaving the protective fold of con-
strained government and entering a private regime that may not be sub-
ject to the same constitutional constraints.
The problem is not necessarily a lack of information,21 ° but a lack of
an understanding of the significance of that information. It is admittedly
difficult to cure this latter lack. Disclosure that is different in kind may
be required, such as very simple statements that call attention to the fact
that one will be living under a different legal regime than that which pre-
vails in the municipality in which the private development is located, and
that property rights are configured and protected differently in this re-
gime.
A banking analogy may help. When banks began to sell mutual
funds and other non-FDIC insured investment products, a primary con-
cern was consumer confusion. Regulators worried that consumers who
have come to expect a certain level of governmental protection and
safety when they purchase a product in a bank would not easily under-
stand that banks were now offering investment products that lacked
those familiar protections."' The FDIC and other federal bank regula-
tors ultimately issued the 1994 Interagency Statement of Retail Sales of
Nondeposit Investment Products, which required specific disclosures to
customers-both orally and in writing-that the investment is not FDIC
insured, that it is not backed by the bank, and that it carries an invest-
arguments relating to this question); Callies et al., supra note 1, at 188-91 (discussing this question);
Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472 (1985) (arguing that residen-
tial associations should be treated like cities for purposes of constitutional civil liberties).
210. The UCIOA requires numerous, detailed disclosures, UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNER-
SHIP ACT § 4-103, 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 12 (1994), and various state statutes have for some time required cer-
tain disclosures. See, e.g., NATELSON, supra note 50, at 364-66 (discussing disclosure requirements);
Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647, 649-50 (1981) (describing
"second-generation" statutes requiring more detailed disclosures, including "disclosure of any cove-
nants or restrictions affecting the owners' use of their property"); id. at 650 n.16 (noting that munici-
palities may also have their own disclosure requirements).
211. See Helen A. Garten, The Consumerization of Financial Regulation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 287,
295-96 (1999) (explaining that "each subsequent expansion of bank securities powers was coupled
with new rules designed to protect consumers," including "firewalls" between the banking and security




ment risk, including the risk of loss of principal. 12 These disclosures
were deemed necessary to put people on notice that their established ex-
pectations about bank products do not apply to certain investment op-
tions now offered in banks. Similarly, when people enter the familiar
realm of a residential neighborhood, they may expect that the "usual
rules" of governance apply. A clear disclosure that this is not the case
would seem to be essential in clarifying the nature of the choice.
In addition, people who imagine themselves to be entering into a
"community" might pay little attention to codified rules, on the theory
that things can no doubt be amicably worked out, and that no serious
burden on any interests of importance will be imposed. 13 One might ob-
ject that consumers, in joining a community, are nonetheless signing a
contract. No matter how rosy-hued their perceptions of "community"
may be, people know, or at least ought to know, that contracts are formal
legal obligations that have binding force. Yet consumers' past experi-
ences with contracts are unlikely to prepare them for the regimes they
are entering. Most laypeople entering into home purchase agreements
will have had some experience with employment contracts, residential
leases, and the like. They will have learned a thing or two in the course
of those dealings. First, what the contract says is often irrelevant to one's
day to day interactions. Second, you can always try to bargain for favor-
able changes with the other party. Third, if bargaining does not work,
you can typically just break the agreement and pay a penalty.
For example, individuals starting a new job are often confronted
with piles of documentation about office rules. Most individuals do not
spend hours poring over these terms before accepting the job, knowing
through experience that informal norms are likely to trump the written
rules. Similarly, parties in ongoing contractual relationships may carry
on business in accordance with unwritten norms, rather than strictly in-
sisting on compliance with written contract terms-at least until a rup-
ture in the relationship occurs. 14 Because entering a community is not
likely to be viewed as a threatening juncture in one's life, people may er-
roneously assume that the rather careless and dismissive attitude toward
legal texts that has served them in good stead throughout their lives re-
mains appropriate. Yet, for some of the structural and doctrinal reasons
discussed above, 15 the usual sorts of "everyday" ways of dealing with
212. Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products, 1 Fed. Reserve
Reg. Serv. 3-1579.51 (Transmittal 177, Nov. 1995); see Garten, supra note 211, at 296-97 (discussing
the consumer protections contained in the Interagency Statement).
213. See Winokur, supra note 8, at 100-01 (explaining that even those homebuyers aware of the
restrictions on their properties may "inaccurately expect[] that friendly relations with neighbors will
avoid hostile disagreements between residents over enforcement").
214. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-98 (1996) (discussing differences between
"relationship-preserving norms" and "end-game norms" used by merchants in the grain and feed in-
dustry).
215. See supra Part II.
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other people without resorting to legal texts may not be available in pri-
vate developments. Homebuyers may, therefore, fail to fully appreciate
that they are entering a regime in which rules have real bite, and in which
difficulties with those rules cannot be readily smoothed over or negoti-
ated around.
Of course, consumer mistakes based on faulty expectations can be
remedied through combinations of experience and disclosure. 16 Expec-
tations thwarted often enough are eventually adjusted to align with real-
ity, and disclosures may work to "reset" expectations more quickly than
experience alone.17 Yet the problems remain important ones to discuss,
in part precisely because they are so readily remedied. If unmet expecta-
tions explain a significant proportion of the problems in homeowners as-
sociations today, then we should see improvement over time. If people
come to understand what they are getting into and do not like it, then
they will presumably demand something different. If, however, people
remain unable to get what they want from private developments even af-
ter their expectations have been realigned, then that points to deeper
problems in the private development regime.
V. THE IMPACT OF SERVITUDE REGIMES ON NORMS
AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
There is an additional factor that may keep people who enter pri-
vate developments from getting what they want -the impact of the servi-
tude regime itself on the prospects for community, and on the develop-
ment and deployment of social norms.218 Homeowners are concerned
not only with their homes' resale values, but also with the quality of the
homeownership experience. The quality of that experience depends, in
turn, not just on the physical or aesthetic environmental outcomes that
the development manages to achieve or maintain, but also on the charac-
216. Life in a community constitutes an "experience good"-a type of good that has qualities
which cannot be directly observed by a consumer in advance. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Interpreting
Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 720-21 (1985) (distinguishing "experience" goods from
"search goods" whose attributes can be observed prior to purchase, and crediting Phillip Nelson for
establishing this distinction). Consumers can obviously gain information about the attributes of ex-
perience goods over time, but when purchases are large and infrequent, the information-gathering
process takes longer. Id. at 721. Because an experience good interposes a period of delay between
consumer purchase and consumer feedback about a product, it would be expected to reduce producer
responsiveness. I thank Alan Schwartz for suggesting the applicability of "experience good" analysis.
217. See infra notes 285-86 (discussing interplay between experience and expectations). Relying
on experience to reset expectations can yield unfortunate distributive results, as it means some people
must learn lessons "the hard way"-through experiences that fall short of prior expectations. How-
ever, disclosures can only speed shifts in expectations to the extent they are read and understood.
218. Frank Michelman has observed that while private property may often be "a prudent re-
sponse to a given state of trustlessness," it is also possible that "particular private property arrange-
ments sanction and reinforce trustlessness." Michelman, supra note 77, at 34; see also Richard H.
Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2055, 2073 (1996) (discuss-
ing the possibility that "law can interact destructively with social norms" by "failing to appreciate the
overall systems through which norms are created, enforced, and changed").
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ter of the interactions that take place among neighbors.2"9 The idea that
using contractual mechanisms to control interactions among neighbors
may erode something valuable in the community experience is explored
at length in a recent article by Paula Franzese.220 Franzese concludes that
"present CIC [common interest community] planning patterns and
modes of dispute resolution, with their emphasis on formalized mandates
and broad enforcement mechanisms, create cultures of distrust....
[F]ormal legal institutions are called upon to accomplish what once was
left (and is best left) to informal networks and social capital." '221 This ob-
servation ties in with concerns about the loss of community and the al-
leged general decline in social capital in this country."'
Before examining this problem, it is worth articulating the benefits
that might flow from the use of formal legal mechanisms to control the
finer points of community life. The primary benefit has to do with ease
of enforcement: one need not confront a neighbor directly about a par-
ticular rule infraction and risk hard feelings or retaliation; instead, there
is a 900-pound gorilla-the homeowners association- that can be called
in to do the enforcement dirty work.2 Constance Perin explains that
even though Americans dislike confrontation, they appear perfectly will-
ing to complain anonymously to authorities about their neighbors. 24
While there are authorities to whom one can complain whether or not
219. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 572-74
(2001) (observing that people find cooperative social interactions intrinsically valuable, and that social
as well as economic benefits can flow from cooperative management of a common resource);
Reichman, supra note 6, at 281 (observing that the purpose of a private community is not "only to
maximize services while minimizing costs," but also "to increase the overall enjoyment of the commu-
nity").
220. See generally Franzese, supra note 8.
221. Id. at 561-62; see also id. at 589 (citing Putnam and Lang & Danielson on dangers of shifting
from informal mechanisms for resolving disputes to formal legal apparatus).
222. See e.g., ROBERT E. LANE, THE LOSS OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES 103-09
(2000); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COM-
MUNITY 147 (2000) ("For better or worse, we rely increasingly-we are forced to rely increasingly-on
formal institutions, and above all on the law, to accomplish what we used to accomplish through in-
formal networks reinforced by generalized reciprocity-that is, through social capital."). The concern
is obviously not unique to homeowners associations. See generally Hyatt, supra note 8 (questioning
Franzese's reliance on generalized social phenomena in her critique of common interest communities).
However, the fact that private developments offer their residents greater control over the terms of
their interactions presents a valid opportunity to explore whether a move that exacerbates or counter-
acts this generalized societal trend is preferable.
223. See CONSTANCE PERIN, BELONGING IN AMERICA 80 (1988) ("Directly complaining to a
neighbor can readily be seen as telling them what to do. When a personal show of superiority is cul-
turally forbidden, substituting the impersonal, yet legitimate, authority of local government and
homeowner boards makes much sense."); cf. id. (describing the idea of the "'generalized bastard,"'
which is "one of several peace-keeping devices American communes use").
224. Id. at 68-69. This same idea was echoed by one of Gregory Alexander's interviewees:
My neighbor's pool had no draining ditch so the water was ruining our garden. We asked them
twice to do something about it but they did nothing. Then we took it to the homeowners' associa-
tion and action was taken by the board. This was much more comfortable for us since we can still
be friendly with them and hostile confrontation was minimized.
Alexander, supra note 8, at 161.
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one lives in a private development, 25 the servitude regime, by codifying
in greater detail the rules of behavior and by providing a dedicated
mechanism for enforcing those rules, legitimates a wider scope of com-
plaints and makes complaining more effective.
In one sense, this move is efficient. Punishment is always costly to
the punisher, and there is a tendency to let things go and to try to free
ride on the punishment efforts of others. 26 Precommitting to uniformly
harsh punishment by setting up a system to do the punishing is one way
of keeping the system of rules from breaking down.27 In another sense,
it may be socially costly if it causes a decline in skills relating to neighbor
interaction and retards the development and entrenchment of social
norms that could do the work of law without the involvement of law.22s
People in ongoing reciprocal relationships with neighbors may exhibit a
certain degree of tolerance and forbearance, a "live and let live" mental-
ity that facilitates life in a community.229 Where these relationships are
robust, longstanding, and multifaceted, frequent recourse to authorities
is unnecessary.23 °
One might argue that contract is simply the wrong model for inter-
action in certain settings, such as families or neighborhoods.23' Yet even
contractual relationships need not involve the detailed rules and strict
enforcement actions that often typify life in private developments. Com-
225. PERIN, supra note 223, at 68-69 (observing that neighbors will complain anonymously not
only to homeowners associations, but also to building inspectors and animal control personnel, and
predicting that people would complain to the police more frequently about their neighbors if it were
possible to do so anonymously).
226. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 158 (explaining that enforcement of private covenants "creates a
free rider problem" because "[liegal action against a violator of the covenants can be expensive for
one neighbor who would be providing a free service for all the others in the neighborhood"); see also
YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF
THE STATE 45 (2002) (observing that "[i]nflicting punishment is costly," and discussing use of third-
party enforcement to overcome the problems associated with self-enforcement); JON ELSTER, THE
CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 41 (1989) (explaining that punishment concen-
trates costs on the punisher while bestowing diffuse benefits on all the members of the group).
227. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 10, at 1400-01 (explaining that "the association, as the mem-
bers' representative, is capable of overcoming the obstacles to collective action.... The presence of
the association reduces enforcement costs by creating a repeat player who is charged with monitoring
compliance and designating the association as the party who must seek redress").
228. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
207-29 (1991) (discussing remedial norms).
229. See id. at 52-62 (discussing norms of reciprocity, a willingness to "'lump"' small amounts of
damage, and general attitude of "'live and let live' that prevails among Shasta County rural
neighbors); PERIN, supra note 223, at 71 (quoting one neighbor with seven children who chose not to
confront a neighbor about a barking dog, reasoning that her children may have created annoyances for
that neighbor at times).
230. ELLICKSON, supra note 228, at 59 (explaining that "[t]he longtime ranchers of Shasta County
pride themselves on being able to resolve their problems on their own," and rarely contact public offi-
cials for assistance; ranchette owners, in contrast, will sometimes contact authorities to deal with a mi-
nor trespass issue).
231. See PERIN, supra note 223, at 74 (suggesting that much of the discomfort between neighbors
arises out of the confusing mixture of market and personal elements involved in homeownership);
Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 287 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,
1990) (critiquing the pervasive application of the contract template to social reality).
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plex contractual relationships that involve uncertain future contingencies
often contain obligations that are framed in quite general terms.232 In
addition, repeat-play contractual relationships often permit a greater de-
gree of give and take than the contractual language itself might suggest.233
Parties in ongoing contractual relationships often confer small benefits
on each other, including forbearance where minor deviations from con-
tractual obligations are necessary. Despite the existence of written con-
tracts spelling out obligations, parties often hold back from requiring
them to be enforced to the letter, in a spirit of mutual cooperation.34 Of
course, even where reciprocal forbearance is the rule, things can shift to
an "end-game" state involving resort to the strict terms of the contract
when the relationship sours. 5 Insistence upon contract terms, then, may
be symptomatic of a failed relationship. One businessman in Stewart
Macauley's study of noncontractual business practices put it this way:
"You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want
to do business again."6 Likewise, a neighbor's resort to legal authorities
or insistence upon legal rights may signify a breakdown in the neighborly
relationship.237
As Lisa Bernstein has emphasized, a legal approach that looks to
parties' course of performance in adjudicating the meaning of contrac-
tual terms may make it less likely "that transactors in ongoing relation-
ships will flexibly adjust their contractual obligations, even in situations
232. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1092 (1981) (explaining that "[a] typical response to this problem of complexity and uncertainty
is to define the performance standard in unusually general terms"). Clayton Gillette has suggested
that private developments can be understood as relational contracts, see Gillette, supra note 10, at
1413-21, and he argues that this characterization is not undermined by the relatively specific terms
contained in the development's covenants, id. at 1418-19. It is ultimately an empirical question
whether the arrangements that prevail in private developments manage to obtain the advantages asso-
ciated with relational contracts, but the possibility that overspecification of duties and rights impedes
the sorts of flexible interactions characteristic of well-functioning relational contracts deserves atten-
tion.
233. See Bernstein, supra note 214, at 1796-1802 (discussing merchants' use of "relationship-
preserving norms").
234. See id at 1787-88 (explaining that "[i]n many contexts, transactors accept late payment, vary
quantity terms, assume new obligations, waive covenants, and adjust prices in ways that their written
contracts do not require"); id. at 1787 n.82 (collecting sources on divergence of actual business prac-
tices from written contractual terms).
235. See id. at 1800-01 (concluding that "Macaulay's study suggests that the terms of a written
contract are viewed as relevant primarily when transactors have decided not to deal again, that is,
when their relationship is at an end-game") (citing Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963)).
236. Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55, 61 (1963), quoted in Bernstein, supra note 214, at 1800.
237. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 228, at 60 (discussing the rarity of lawsuits and claims for
monetary relief among neighbors in rural Shasta Country, because, as one resident explained, "Being
good neighbors means no lawsuits"); PERIN, supra note 223, at 72-73 (describing pattern by which
previously ignored concerns are reported to authorities when some triggering event occurs between
the neighbors, often completely unrelated to the concern that ends up being reported).
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where it would be desirable for them to do so. ''238 In other words, parties
may be reluctant to tolerate the ordinary deviations from contract lan-
guage that are the stuff of ongoing relationships- accepting late pay-
ments, for example-if doing so will cause a court to later interpret the
contract to permit such deviations. Thus, enabling parties to deal with
each other flexibly while leaving intact strict contract language to which
they may resort in the event things reach an end-game state may be value
maximizing. 9 By the same token, neighbors might wish to have a set of
legally enforceable rules to which they could resort if necessary, but
might prefer to operate most of the time according to informal
neighborly norms that do not involve strict adherence to those rules.24
Yet this approach is difficult in the private development setting, at least
to the extent that courts will construe a failure to enforce a rule in a
given instance as a waiver or abandonment of that rule that will preclude
its enforcement in a later instance. 241
The detailed codification itself could also reduce incentives towards
cooperation that might otherwise be present. It is sometimes asserted
that reducing uncertainty through explicit rules will reduce litigation, as
the parties will know the precise consequences of each contemplated ac-
tion.242 Parties will know their rights and will steer clear of conflict by ei-
ther abiding by the rules or bargaining around them. 43 In the private de-
velopment context, however, explicit bargaining over entitlements will
often be impossible or futile. At the same time, detailed CC&Rs remove
the kinds of uncertainty over legal entitlements that might grease the
wheels of mutually beneficial cooperation.2" In a world where home-
238. Bernstein, supra note 214, at 1809 (discussing the potentially deleterious effects of the Uni-
form Commercial Code's treatment of "course of performance").
239. See id. at 1811 (discussing potential interference of the Code's approach with the ability of
parties to choose "the value-maximizing combination of legally enforceable contractual provisions and
extralegal provisions"); see also JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-
1991, at 387 (1993) (explaining value of formal "fallback" rights in enabling people to deal with each
other in informal ways most of the time).
240. See Pildes, supra note 218, at 2073 (explaining that social norms "include norms of enforce-
ment, including norms analogous to the state's 'prosecutorial discretion"'); id. (describing wide range
of responses available in a norm-based system featuring decentralized enforcement and explaining
that such a system permits "enforcement to be tailored to subtle differences in the contexts of viola-
tions").
241. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57; see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 52, at 235 (observ-
ing that "rules that allow rights to erode even as a result of friendly, negotiated, breach may indeed
serve as an obstacle to cooperatively agreeing on ad hoc, value-increasing, concessions").
242. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 55, 75
(1987) (contending that litigation is more likely if there is more uncertainty).
243. See Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Introduction: The Economic Approach to
Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 6 (Terry L. Anderson &
Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (presenting as a basic postulate that "a system of well-specified and
transferable property rights encourages positive-sum games with mutual gains from trade" and ex-
plaining that this system avoids the conflict that might accompany unclear or underenforced rights).
244. See Ian Ayres & Eric TaUey, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facili-
tate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1035 & n.29 (1995) (arguing that legal uncertainty about the
ownership of a given entitlement can lead to more efficient bargaining); Jason Scott Johnston, Bar-
gaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 257 (1995) (explaining that where
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owners' land uses are not closely controlled through detailed written
rules, it is not always clear who holds the entitlement with respect to a
given use-say, having a single pet llama on a three-acre residential lot.
If it is not clear whether the authorities would require the removal of the
llama or uphold the llama-owner's right to keep the pet, then the llama-
owner and the neighbor are more likely to arrive at a compromise that
reflects the respective values they place on that aspect of neighborhood
life.
245
The servitude regime not only takes away the uncertainty that
might facilitate bargaining, it takes away any possibility of binding bar-
gains between neighbors. Even if the two neighbors reach an agreement,
the homeowners association could still enforce a "no llamas" covenant
against the llama-owner."4 By removing this source of power from indi-
vidual neighbors, a servitude regime also strips neighbors of the ability to
refrain from the exercise of such power-that is, to confer gifts on their
neighbors in the form of forbearance. Vestiges of favor-giving remain,
however, where some violations remain unknown to the homeowners as-
sociation, and neighbors have the opportunity to refrain from reporting
the violation.2 47 Nevertheless, the codification and uniform enforcement
of rules may erode trust in insidious ways, if neighbors become "infor-
mants" who "report" violations to the "authorities.
2 48
A related concern is that formal rules mandating and prohibiting
specific actions may crowd out internally motivated acts of neighborli-
ness.2 49  For example, a person who might spend extra money on nice
parties possess private information about how much a given entitlement is valued, or how harmful an
encroachment on it might be, "bargaining may be more efficient under a blurry balancing test than
under a certain rule").
245. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 244, at 1099-1100 (providing a similar example in which it is
unclear whether a factory or a nearby laundry holds the entitlement to control the factory's pollution;
because either party might be in the position of either buying or selling the entitlement, valuations will
be more honest, facilitating bargains).
246. See MCKENZIE, supra note 11, at 17 (presenting the example where a couple's presentation
of a petition signed by three-fourths of the homeowners in the community was insufficient to get the
homeowners association to permit a metal swing set in the couple's backyard).
247. In the words of another of Alexander's interviewed homeowners: "I have become friendly
with my neighbors because water from our backyard was seeping into theirs and they did not call in
the homeowners' association. Instead, they chose to speak to us personally and now we continue to be
friendly." Alexander, supra note 8, at 161.
248. PERIN, supra note 223, at 80 ("American convictions about avoiding a fuss and not settling
one face to face do, however, have a social cost. They ostensibly keep the local peace, but the person
who's been 'turned in' is likely to remain permanently suspicious of neighbors once the anger boils off;
long-time friendships come to grief."); Alexander, supra note 8, at 161 (relating the complaint of a
homeowner, who claimed neighbors would "come to visit outwardly acting friendly but they are really
checking up on you. My neighbors reported me for having a clothes line in my back yard, out of sight
of the road, when they were supposedly visiting casually.").
249. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83,124 (1978) ("Under a regime
of liability for failure to rescue, it would be impossible for a rescuer to prove that he was motivated by
altruism-for how could he negate the inference that he really was motivated by fear of liability?"); see
also Mark A. Cohen, Norms Versus Laws: Economic Theory and the Choice of Social Institutions, in
SOCIAL NORMS AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 95, 99 (Kenneth J. Koford & Jeffrey B. Miller eds.,
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fencing material, in part to confer a benefit on a neighbor, may now be
required to use the nicer fencing material, making the act one of obliga-
tion rather than one of altruism or generosity. In turn, the benefited
neighbor is unlikely to feel any sense of gratitude or deeper connection
with the fence-builder as a result of the choice of construction material,
having received only what was due under the terms of the CC&Rs.
Likewise, specifying formal penalties for deviations from norms of
neighborly behavior could negatively alter the terms of the neighborly
interaction, potentially leading to less neighborliness. °
If law is displacing or disabling the operation of norms of coopera-
tion, then it is worth investigating whether norms are more efficient than
legally binding covenants in this context.25' Norms may be cheaper in the
long run than constant litigation, even if people have to incur some initial
costs to get them going.1 2 Also, if some degree of cooperation is impor-
tant in creating a good community, it may be the case that social norms
work better at fostering the kind of trust necessary for this cooperation
than do legal restrictions. At a minimum, we should be conscious about
the effects of increased codification of the finer points of daily life and
recognize that this may be displacing some other values. This is not to
suggest that we could necessarily get the same detail and level of control
through norms as we currently have under the law. Indeed, if norms
1991) (citing Landes & Posner and discussing the interaction between internally motivated samaritan-
ism and legal rules imposing liability).
250. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini found an analogous effect in their study of private day care
centers in Israel. When a fine was introduced for the late pick-up of children, late pick-ups rose sig-
nificantly. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2000). The au-
thors posit that the introduction of the fine may have altered the participants' perceptions of the rather
imprecisely defined strategic interaction in which they were engaged, hence changing their behavior in
an unexpected fashion. Id. at 15-16. Before the fine was introduced, parents may have been loathe to
"take advantage" of the teacher's generosity in staying late to care for their children; after the fine was
introduced, the teacher's after-hours childcare was likely viewed as a service provided for a fee. Id. at
13-14. In instances where social norms supporting a given cooperative behavior are not robust, at-
taching a price to noncooperative behavior may increase cooperation. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes,
75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1255-60 (2000) (discussing the positive effects of San Diego's FasTrak program,
which permits solo drivers to use HOV lanes for a price, on carpooling and on compliance with HOV
lane designations). Significantly, however, drivers on the freeway are strangers to each other, not
neighbors engaged in repeat interactions. See id. at 1273-74 (discussing this contextual feature of
freeway norms).
251. We should not, however, automatically assume that norms are always better than law. In
some situations, law may offer a less costly alternative. See Cohen, supra note 249, at 96 (arguing that
law should be chosen over norms whenever "the social cost of enforcing norms exceeds the social cost
of enforcing laws").
252. Importantly, the existence of legal rules can influence the degree to which people find them-
selves willing to incur these start-up costs. For example, the absence of law may both increase the
pressure toward the development of cooperative norms and leave space for such norms to develop.
See Franzese, Building Community, supra note 9, at 33 (arguing that common interest communities
"have it backwards" by beginning with rigid rules, and that they should instead "give informal norms a
chance to develop"); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Ca-
thedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 464 (1995) (suggesting that people might be more
likely to learn how to reduce the costs of bargaining with each other where law does not step in to ren-
der such bargaining unnecessary).
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tend to generate a world in which small infractions are tolerated in a
spirit of reciprocity, then the kinds of extreme regimentation found in
some private developments might be impossible to sustain through a
norm-based system. Yet if the goal is not regimentation per se, but
rather a premium ambience, then regimentation is just a means to an
end. Norms might well provide a better means to that same end, while
also helping to serve some of the important social ends associated with
life in a community.
More is at stake than just the experiential quality of community life
that residents of private developments experience, as important as that
may be. These private developments must also govern themselves, an
activity that requires a certain amount of participatory interaction. Mul-
tiplying the number and complexity of rules in order to help neighbors
stay out of each others' way may be exactly the wrong way to foster the
kinds of cooperative norms that would facilitate robust, resilient commu-
nities. It has been well noted that most private development residents
are apathetic about matters of community governance.5 3 Alexander ar-
gues that residents may lack a "participatory consciousness" and that this
may explain their apathy and frustration in private developments. 4 It
might also explain their failure to make meaningful use of voice, even in
circumstances where it should be attractive -that is, where dissatisfaction
exists and exit is costly.55 It is perhaps ironic that people who have by
some accounts "defected" in the larger public game of community re-
sponsibility by fleeing to a private development 2 6 are now faced with
new collective action problems that are just as insoluble and no less con-
tentious or problematic than the ones they left behind.
Indeed, the rather atomistic, consumer-oriented view of homeown-
ership upon which private developments are premised may be funda-
mentally at odds with the kind of participatory ethic necessary to make
the private development responsive and workable over the long run.2
253. See, e.g., Silverman & Barton, supra note 9, at 138-39 (describing general phenomenon of
underparticipation and disinterest in HOA governance, and quoting one HOA board president who
explained that "'[a]pathy reigns supreme-most owners want some unpaid volunteer to make deci-
sions for them rather than attending board or annual meetings. We are running out of fools who will
volunteer their time"').
254. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 163-68 (discussing the need for, and preconditions for, "par-
ticipatory consciousness").
255. Id. at 163 (observing that "[a] paradox exists here: residents are disgruntled, but they neither
leave nor participate to change the way their developments are governed").
256. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Essay, Privatized Communities and the "Secession of the Success-
fid": Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675 (2001); Robert B. Reich,
Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 16 (discussing movement of
the well-off into communities that are homogeneous with regard to income, and a resulting failure to
identify with, or recognize responsibility for, the problems of poorer communities).
257. See Barton & Silverman, supra note 1, at 303 (observing that "[tlhe libertarian, free-market
perspective draws on a widely held belief that private property ownership does allow one to escape
from interdependence from others"); Gillette, supra note 10, at 1440 (observing that "it seems some-
what anomalous to assume that association members migrate to a common area in order to seek isola-
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We might even query whether at least some of the people who have self-
selected into such communities have done so in part because they are less
skilled at cooperative participation 8 and would prefer a world in which
they simply "don't have to deal" with the unpredictable interactions that
typify life in a heterogeneous community.2 9 As private developments be-
come more ubiquitous and heterogeneous, any such self-selection should
wane. Nevertheless, we might consider whether the image of a home-
owner as an independent consumer seeking a hassle-free, single-serving
housing product has influenced the formal legal mechanisms for control-
ling land use in private developments, shaping them in ways that make
authentic cooperative interactions among neighbors more difficult and
unlikely.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The factors discussed above might keep the market from delivering
what people really want in a servitude regime. Some of the factors work
together to push servitudes toward a strict convergence point, and then
keep them there.21 Other factors keep developers from learning and re-
acting to consumer preferences.261 Still other factors are inherent in the
servitude regime as it is presently constituted, but need not inevitably be
so. 262 Together, they suggest that law might play some valid role in re-
moving obstacles so that the market can deliver on preferences. In this
article, I have focused on pointing out problems, while saying very little
about possible solutions. It may be that the problems facing residents in
private communities are no worse than the problems facing residents in
ordinary municipal neighborhoods. It may also be the case that any fully
examined solutions would present more problems and costs than they
would resolve. Moreover, because the prescriptions will vary for each of
the imperfections described, a starting point for reform would be an em-
pirical assessment of the extent to which each factor contributes to the
disconnect between consumer demand and market supply. Finally, it is
not really possible to begin making recommendations without first exam-
ining some of the problems that have been left consciously unexamined
in this article-the impacts of private communities on those who are ex-
cluded and on the fabric of society as a whole. I will therefore close with
tion within homogeneity and to live by highly tailored, privatized regulations, and simultaneously to
assume that they seek the robust debate of a diverse political marketplace").
258. See PERIN, supra note 223, at 74 ("In drawing the line between their Personal and Property
relationships, suburban neighbors may be financially adept, but, as a consequence, socially clumsy.").
259. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 1440-41 (discussing this possibility). In other words, one might
say that people who consciously choose private developments are seeking a "plug and play" version of
neighborhood life that minimizes the hassles that accompany interactions with others. I thank Scott
Peppet for this turn of phrase.
260. See supra Part 11I.
261. See supra Part IV.
262. See supra Part V.
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just a few general observations that correspond to the points made
above.
A. Introducing Greater Flexibility
The neighborhood environment is obviously vulnerable to collective
action problems of the "tragedy of the commons" variety, and servitude
regimes represent a response to that threat.263 Less recognized is the pos-
sibility that this response may create an aesthetic anticommons of sorts.2'
The use of detailed uniform rules, which can be eased only with the con-
sent of every other person in the development, blocks efficient draws
against neighborhood ambience. The likely result is an inefficiently low
incidence of ambience-impacting homeowner behaviors. The problem
might also be conceptualized as overproduction or overprotection of the
local public good of premium neighborhood ambience. Internal political
solutions are unlikely to address these shortfalls in a meaningful way,
particularly in instances involving intense but unusual preferences.
In addressing these difficulties, we might start by considering adapt-
ing those tools that have long been used in the municipal zoning context:
the Takings Clause, the nonconforming use doctrine, the variance, and
the special exception. To interject more market freedom into the system,
private developments might make release from a given covenant market-
able, with compensation to be paid to those most directly affected.265
Perhaps there would even be a way to introduce an analog to the trad-
able emission permit in the private development setting -something like
a "tradable eccentricity permit" that would relieve a homeowner from
their choice of any one of a designated set of aesthetic use restrictions.
These might be auctioned off to the highest bidder, or assigned to home-
owners upon their entry into the community.
Alternatively, the use of standards rather than rules to control land
use could permit importation of some information about the benefits de-
rived by a given actor.266 For example, someone who violates a rule
about fencing in order to keep a young child from falling off of a cliff is
clearly receiving a much larger benefit from the fencing action than is
someone who simply prefers having a noncompliant fence for aesthetic
reasons. It is completely plausible that a standard (e.g., a rule limiting
263. See supra note 71 (discussing the tragedy of the commons problem).
264. See supra note 77 (discussing the anticommons problem).
265. See NELSON, supra note 81, ch.17, at 21-27 (discussing possibility of extending Robert Ellick-
son's idea of private zoning bargains to private development context) (citing Robert C. Ellickson, Al-
ternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 CHI. L. REV. 681
(1973)).
266. See, e.g., Hyatt, supra note 8, at 69-70 (urging an approach to governance employing stan-
dards rather than rules); James L. Winokur, Ancient Strands Rewoven, or Fashioned out of Whole
Cloth?: First Impressions of the Emerging Restatement of Servitudes, 27 CONN. L. REv. 131, 149-50
(1994). Much has been written on the choice between rules and standards in law. See, e.g., Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985).
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fences to those reasonably necessary for safety) could be formulated to
take this difference in benefits into account in some rough way. Such ex-
treme cases aside, however, it will often be difficult to accurately assess
the extent of benefits that different people receive, at least in the absence
of some pricing mechanism. There are also additional administrative
costs associated with applying a flexible standard rather than a bright-
line rule, and the additional discretion vested in a decision maker who
uses a standard may be independently worrisome.267
Another possibility would be for private developments to specify in
the governing documents that enforcement of servitudes will be limited
to damages;268 however, it is nearly impossible to imagine how a court
would begin to arrive at the damages amount for many sorts of viola-
tions. Assessments of such matters as aesthetic pain, the marginal impact
on resale values, and diminution of* premium ambience are inherently
problematic. Such a specification of relief might be workable, however,
if accompanied by a specified schedule of damages, perhaps allowing ad-
justments in either direction, not to exceed a certain percentage annually.
This schedule of damages would serve a sorting and informational func-
tion; people would know the price of violations in a given community
and could sort themselves out accordingly.269  My point in raising these
possibilities is not to suggest that there are off-the-shelf options that can
be costlessly applied to the private development setting, but rather to
suggest some directions in which innovation and experimentation might
move.
In addition, we might do well to rethink the liberalization of servi-
tude enforcement that has overtaken the courts. In this vein, we might
consider the work that was previously done by formalistic requirements
for real covenants, and the reasons underlying the former judicial hostil-
ity towards servitudes in general.27 It is easy to understand the modern
antipathy toward any impediments that stand in the way of the gains
267. See, e.g., Winokur, supra note 266, at 149-50 (noting these drawbacks).
268. I thank Francesco Parisi for bringing this possibility to my attention. Cf. Robert P. Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (discussing the possibility, in the intellectual property realm, that parties
could "contract into" organizations that would then be governed by liability rules chosen by mutual
agreement).
269. See Elberg, supra note 52, at 1995-96 (discussing signaling function of supercompensatory
contract clauses and the potential for their use in common interest developments, as well as their limi-
tations in that setting); cf. Merges, supra note 268, at 1303 (suggesting that organizations handling in-
tellectual property matters could "offer a fixed menu of terms" that would be "determined by their
members and not the government"). A schedule of fines would not work well if people failed to read
the schedules. See supra Part IV.C (discussing homebuyer ignorance). A "price list" for violations
might also sharpen some of the concerns about norm atrophy. See supra Part V. In a forthcoming
article, I revisit the idea of liability rule schedules and explore a more fine-grained approach to ad-
dressing problems in the neighborhood commons. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV.
L. REV. (forthcoming March 2005).
270. See Winokur, supra note 9, at 84-96 (discussing some of the functions served by traditional
requirements for running covenants).
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people might be able to achieve through servitudes. 7' As Richard Ep-
stein has noted, the private development structure enables large numbers
of parties to enter into reciprocally binding covenants with each other
through the central figure of the developer, rather than separately enter-
ing into pairwise contracts with each other resident, and vastly reduces
the transactions costs associated with covenanting.272 Enabling the cen-
tral entity of a homeowners association to enforce covenants also elimi-
nates free rider problems that might otherwise eviscerate covenant en-
forcement." 3 Yet these gains come at a price.
Homeowners in private developments who glean the advantages of
easy covenant formation and enforcement give up the option of later
working out individualized adjustments in light of changes in their pref-
erences or personal circumstances. Contracts are always about giving up
options, of course; that is their point. But ordinary contracts create in
personam rights that run in favor of a limited number of known parties;274
if circumstances change, then one can return to those same parties to
seek a release or attempt a renegotiation. Covenants in a private devel-
opment, in contrast, are formed wholesale in a single moment with an en-
tire neighborhood of current and future property owners, and effectively
scatter what were previously in rem property use privileges among a mul-
titude of parties.275 The law has placed no limit on the number of parties
to whom one can bind oneself with a single purchase, yet each of those
parties must be dealt with individually in order to secure any change in
271. See Epstein, supra note 75, at 908 ("[W]hat the law can do is try to reduce the transactions
costs of the voluntary arrangements needed to exploit real estate within the confines established by
law.").
272. Id. at 914-15 (observing that 4950 pairwise covenants would have to be created in a 100-
person community, were it not possible to handle covenants through a central party such as a devel-
oper, who can make a single covenant with each resident that reciprocally binds and benefits that resi-
dent vis A vis all other residents in the community).
273. See supra note 226 (citing sources describing this problem).
274. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 773, 776-77 (2001) (distinguishing in personam contract rights which only bind specific parties,
with in rem property rights which "bind 'the rest of the world'); id. at 780 & n.14 (discussing the de-
velopment of this idea).
275. The in rem character of property is usually expressed in terms of exclusion rights; if one owns
property, "the whole world" must stay off unless invited on. See id. at 782, 789 (focusing on exclusion
rights in property). However, the in rem notion logically extends to permissible property uses-
"privileges" in Wesley Hohfeld's schema. See id. at 782-83 (noting that any of Hohfeld's jural concep-
tions could be in rem or in personam). If the law gives a homeowner the privilege to use her land in a
particular way, then that privilege runs against everyone else in the world who might wish to stop that
use. As long as she holds the privilege, they have no legal recourse to stop it; in Hohfeldian terms,
they have a "no-right." See id. at 781 n.20 (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Le-
gal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 38 (1913)). In a private develop-
ment, homeowners typically relinquish many of the use privileges that are part of their standardized
property bundle in exchange for obtaining veto rights over the land uses of others. This is accom-
plished in one fell swoop as to all one's neighbors in a fashion that is consistent with the in rem charac-
ter of the use privileges that one is ceding. However, there is no mechanism (aside from the internal
political process of the homeowners association) for regaining that in rem privilege "whole" -instead,
it must be painstakingly reassembled through a multitude of in personam moves. See infra note 278
and accompanying text (discussing the asymmetrical nature of the fragmentation).
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the contractual terms to which one is bound. This results in an interest-
ing asymmetry. It has never been easier to bind oneself and one's suc-
cessors to a covenant that benefits hundreds or even thousands of other
landowners, and it has never been easier for those numerous other land-
owners to hold one to the covenant. However, nothing analogous has
been done to make it easier for individuals to modify these easily formed
and readily enforced servitudes. 6
The significance of this asymmetry relates to the economic argu-
ment that permitting parties to consensually decompose property with-
out government intervention will advance efficiency. 7  In most settings,
this makes sense - small-number interactions are necessary to effect each
new transfer of a property entitlement, and presumably those same
small-number interactions can undo the work later if need be. Thus, the
decomposition is typically self-limiting -it goes no farther than pairwise
or small-number interactions can take it, and can move nearly as quickly
back in the direction of composition by the same means. 8 In the private
development setting, the natural limits on decomposition provided by the
requirements of small-number bargaining have been removed, but no
analogous help has been provided for moving back in the direction of
composition. From the individual homeowner's perspective, the liberali-
zation of servitude enforcement operates like a one-way ratchet 279 -it is
remarkably easy to get oneself bound, and well-nigh impossible to get
oneself unbound (short of moving away).'
Formal obstacles to the enforcement of covenants, or closer judicial
scrutiny of them, would make it harder for landowners to achieve gains
276. Jay Weiser makes a similar point in observing that the advances in enforcement capabilities
in private developments have not been accompanied by similar improvements in the ability to renego-
tiate the arrangements. Weiser, supra note 52, at 308. It is true that an individual can exit the
neighborhood and hence get out of unwanted servitudes. This course of action may be costly, espe-
cially if the individual places a high subjective value on the home, has made idiosyncratic improve-
ments to it, or has engaged in other site-specific nontransferable investments (e.g., investments in
friendly relationships with the neighbors, development of daily routines and vendor relationships
based on the location of the home, investments in the neighborhood school, and the like).
277. See Michelman, supra note 77, at 18 (discussing and critiquing this argument).
278. Fragmentation of property is often said to be easier to accomplish than reunification. See,
e.g., Heller, Boundaries, supra note 77, at 1165-66 (explaining that "[b]ecause of high transaction costs,
strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases, people may find it easier to divide property than to recom-
bine it"); Parisi, supra note 79, at 626-27 (noting the asymmetries in transaction costs associated with
fragmentation and reunification of property, respectively, that generate a "one-directional stickiness"
and a tendency towards entropy). While it is common to speak of fragmentation as if there were an
alternative, some property interest will be fragmented under any conceivable arrangement. See
Fennell, supra note 77. A better way of framing the concern would be to observe that certain kinds of
fragmented interests are particularly difficult to overcome because the production function associated
with their reunification exhibits a "step" pattern. See id.
279. Heller, Boundaries, supra note 77, at 1185 (observing that "[clurrent CIC laws represent an
example of the one-way ratchet of fragmentation within a limited-exclusion anticommons").
280. Stewart Sterk makes a similar point when he notes that the ease with which servitudes can be
undone bears upon the restrictions we might wish to place on those servitudes. See Sterk, supra note
120, at 956 (observing that "there would be little reason to restrict contractual freedom to impose ser-
vitudes if the transaction costs of removing servitudes were always low").
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through those covenants and would be costly for that reason. But mak-
ing it too easy to create running covenants with large numbers of other
people also makes it harder for landowners to achieve gains over the
long run by optimally adjusting the benefits and the burdens in light of
changing preferences and circumstances. This is not to say that courts
should embrace formal obstacles to, or skepticism about, running cove-
nants. Discarding impediments to covenant formation and enforcement
without introducing some mechanism for achieving individualized flexi-
bility over the long run, however, may ultimately lead to more ineffi-
ciency than is initially avoided through the liberalization of servitude en-
forcement itself.
B. Counteracting Problematic Dynamics
One primary point flows from the discussion of community interde-
pendencies and path dependence: The possibility that communities
could end up with more limits in place than the individuals living within
them would prefer is in no way undermined or negated by the observa-
tion that the individuals in those communities voluntarily chose to live
under the restrictions in question. Collective action problems typically
take precisely that form: What individuals might voluntarily choose act-
ing on their own may leave them collectively worse off than if they had
managed to coordinate their choices. This suggests that substantive lim-
its on covenants might, in some instances, better vindicate individual
preferences than would uncoordinated individual action in the market-
place. Yet, how can we tell in a given instance whether a restriction
represents the true preferences of residents, or whether it instead repre-
sents the sort of market failure that has been presented here as a theo-
retical possibility? Under present legal and market conditions, it may be
difficult to know.
Hence, my second observation: law may have a role to play in set-
ting up rules that elicit and respond to individual preferences more relia-
bly than the existing system. For example, mechanisms that permit a
number of communities to act in concert in setting or adjusting servi-
tudes might help to counter adverse selection. New default rules or re-
quired standard forms may help to counter path dependence by present-
ing parties with a fresh starting point.21
In addition, the law might consider ways to accommodate and en-
courage restrictions that limit, but do not eliminate, a given use or activ-
ity-or, alternatively, to discourage categorical bans on uses that can be
carried on at some level of frequency or intensity without having any
cognizable impact on neighboring properties. In many cases, a given use
281. See Korobkin, supra note 156, at 1605-08 (presenting findings in support of an "'inertia the-
ory"' that posits negotiators will tend to accept default terms and terms in form contracts, other things
being equal, because acceptance of those terms requires no action).
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may become objectionable only when pursued at a high level of intensity,
or with great frequency. Yet, simply banning the practice outright might
seem administratively easier. However, outright bans in numerous
communities can create dynamics that encourage further bans, even
when small amounts of the use in question would be efficient. Making it
easier for private developments to make and enforce partial bans on uses
would alleviate this pressure. Mechanisms designed to introduce flexibil-
ity into the covenant scheme by enabling people to trade off covenant
violations or achieve customized adjustments through the application of
standards, rather than rules, would have the same effect.
C. Refining Market Signals
If part of the difficulty with servitude regimes relates to the poor
quality of the signals transmitted by consumers and received by develop-
ers, 2 then law might play a role in sharpening those signals. One ap-
proach would be to require developers to offer the first set of would-be
residents in a given community an a la carte menu of use restrictions, and
permit them to choose the ones that they would like to make binding on
their community. For example, the first set of home sales contracts in a
given development might contain a contingency clause relating to the
CC&Rs, permitting the homebuyer to rescind the contract if the version
of CC&Rs recorded in the master deed diverged from the homebuyer's
own preferred slate of choices. A developer might be required to use the
input provided by sales contracts on some set percentage of units in the
development (e.g., ten percent) to formulate the CC&Rs in the declara-
tion.83 A rational developer would be expected to negotiate with the
homebuyers and accommodate their preferences in order to avoid losing
sales. While such negotiation is already possible today, it is less common
in the residential context than in the context of commercial develop-
ments.' Making it an established and required part of the residential
development process would likely help to refine the market signals sent
to developers and facilitate their response to those signals.
It is worth reiterating that, to the extent homebuyers fail to impose
proper market discipline as a result of a mismatch between expectations
and reality, the problem should self-correct over time as people gain ex-
perience with this new model of ownership and learn about its attrib-
282. See supra text accompanying notes 162-217.
283. This is not a perfect solution because, as noted above, the first entrants into a given commu-
nity are likely to be the most risk averse about what is to follow. Another difficulty with this approach
is that (tentative) entry into the community precedes the setting of use restrictions, so that preset re-
strictions cannot serve as a way of initially drawing together people with similar preferences. It is a bit
like requiring movie theaters to wait until ten percent of the audience has arrived, and then collabora-
tively decide with them what movie will be shown. However, one might argue that this manner of pro-
ceeding would better fit preferences than would a system where an unresponsive group of theater
owners insisted on always showing the same movie everywhere.
284. Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 7, at 653 n.254.
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utes.285  Expectations are malleable; if thwarted consistently, then they
will be extinguished or reshaped along lines corresponding to experi-
enced reality. 86 Given the relative infrequency of home purchases, how-
ever, waiting for expectations to catch up with reality may not be a de-
fensible course-more proactive forms of expectation readjustment
might be necessary if the choices that consumers make are to be mean-
ingful.287 For example, requiring developers to articulate to homeowners
what they understand to be the scope and limits of homeowner associa-
tion power might serve a helpful clarifying function. Perhaps more im-
portant would be a set of disclosures that would put homebuyers on no-
tice as to the legal differences between purchasing in an ordinary
neighborhood controlled by municipal land use controls and in a private
development governed by private covenants and controlled by a home-
owners association.
D. Developing New Models for Community
Despite the concerns raised in the foregoing account, the neighbor-
hood remains an intriguing and highly promising locus of action-both
inside and outside of private communities. The neighborhood, which
Perin terms "the penultimate nesting box of ourselves as social beings, '
exists at a scale conducive to grassroots involvement, and ought to be an
ideal vehicle for fostering a meaningful sense of community. 289  The
promise of community contained in private development marketing ma-
terials continues to strike a resonant chord with many homebuyers, and a
longing for authentic community forms a strong undercurrent in loca-
285. See, e.g., French, supra note 132 ("As our collective experience with life in common interest
communities increases, more of us will become aware of the risks involved in buying a home in a
common interest community."); Nelson, supra note 2, at 163 (discussing "learning curve" in adapting
to new forms of property).
286. This observation corresponds to a well-known circularity in legal doctrines involving expec-
tations. What people expect is shaped by what people experience, and what people experience is
shaped by the law. See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering In-
herent Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56 (1996) (describing the "reasonable expectations"
model in takings jurisprudence as "hopelessly circular," and that "reasonable expectations are
founded on perceptions of what the law will protect, so the law's protections cannot be based on rea-
sonable expectations"); Robinson, supra note 182, at 564 (explaining that using expectations to gauge
property interests is circular, because "[tihe only basis for determining what people expect... is what
they have been told to expect based on their legal rights.").
287. Barton & Silverman, supra note 1, at 36 (arguing that "[in order to have a genuine choice
people must also understand what they are choosing"); see supra Part IV.C (discussing homebuyer
ignorance).
288. PERIN, supra note 223, at 81.
289. See Ellickson, supra note 8, at 196 (explaining that block-level organizations can serve as "in-
cubators of local social capital"); Franzese, supra note 8, at 590 ("Common interest communities, at
least in theory, have the potential to be models for a revitalized, revivified sense of community.");
Reichman, supra note 6, at 263 (observing that "the structure of the homeowners' association could
unwittingly provide a mechanism for reversing the anti-community trends of the last century," and
noting that "[slince the compactness of the community makes each vote count, participatory democ-
racy might be reinvigorated").
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tional decisions generally.29 In addition, neighborhood organizations, or
smaller block-level organizations, may be uniquely well suited to provide
local public goods and to achieve certain social ends.2 9' For example, if a
neighborhood or block-level subunit has a strong sense of its own collec-
tive identity, its members might view themselves as responsible for the
common areas within its boundaries, and might also identify with other
community members. This level of identification with the neighborhood
and with one's neighbors, which is likely to lead to crime-deterring pat-
terns of monitoring,2 2 might be strengthened by contextual cues such as
signs and gates,293 as well as by interactions-whether structured or in-
formal-among the neighbors themselves.
Because homeowners associations provide a ready-made super-
structure for coordinating small-scale collective action, scholars such as
Robert Ellickson and Robert Nelson have recommended applying the
structural template offered by homeowners associations to existing
neighborhoods. 294 Ellickson concludes that "[t]he resounding success of
RCAs [residential community associations] in new housing develop-
ments indicates the merits of enabling the stakeholders of inner-city
neighborhoods to mimic-at the block level-the micro institutions
commonly found in the suburbs. ''295 These ideas are intriguing ones that
are well worth exploring. Before transplanting features of homeowners
associations into existing neighborhoods, however, we would do well to
consider whether and how well those institutions are working to achieve
the desired ends.
290. See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 8, at 571 (observing that private development advertising plays
on homebuyers' longing for a sense of community).
291. See Ellickson, supra note 5; see also Ellickson, supra note 8, at 193 (arguing that "[t]he block
is the optimal level for the provision of many public goods").
292. One study involved showing convicted burglars a videotape of various dwellings and eliciting
comments about the suitability of each one as a target. TREVOR BENNETr & RICHARD WRIGHT,
BURGLARS ON BURGLARY 63 (1984). Many comments explicitly or implicitly expressed "the fear that
neighbors will know who is a stranger to the area, or to the occupants of the house, and will be more
likely than passers-by to do something about it." Id. at 63. The burglars in the Bennett & Wright
study also paid attention to a number of other risk factors in selecting targets, including the amount of
cover provided, the target's proximity to the road, cues that indicated likely occupancy, the availability
of escape routes, whether or not the dwelling afforded rear access, and the perceived presence or ab-
sence of a dog or a burglar alarm. Id. at 62-66.
293. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1058-62 (2002)
(discussing use of architectural features to create a sense of territoriality among residents). Some of
the visual devices that could be used to heighten an internal sense of identity (such as gates and walls)
would also necessarily foster a sense of separation from the outside world that could have negative
societal impacts. I am setting aside this set of concerns for present purposes, but they would obviously
have to be taken into account in forming any policy prescriptions.
294. See Ellickson, supra note 5; Nelson, supra note 3, at 312-13.
295. Ellickson, supra note 8, at 200.
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